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Harmelin v. Michigan: Is the Eighth
Amendment's Proportionality Guarantee
Left An Empty Shell?

The Eighth Amendment prohibits in explicit language the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.1 Yet the proscription,
while simplistic on its face, remains the subject of active debate.2
Most commentators agree that human decency constitutes the basic3
interest to be served by forbidding cruel and unusual punishment.
Yet no clear agreement exists regarding how this interest can best
be safeguarded.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (imdicating that the determination
of sentence length is purely a legislative function) with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 & n.16
(1983) (holding that legislative determinations of sentence length are subject to review by the courts
to evaluate whether they are within constitutional limits).
3. See, e.g., Note, Crueland UnusualPunishmentClause andthe Substantive CriminalLaw,
79 HARV. L REV. 635, 635 (1966) (noting that the justification ordinarily given for the state's ability
to punish is a utilitarian theory that such punishment is needed to meet long-term goals). The idea
behind the Eighth Amendment is that basic humanity, and the offender's own dignity, set limits that
cannot be violated no matter how worthy the goal to be achieved or how serious the crime. Id. One
aspect of the Eighth Amendments requirement of decency in the treatment of criminal offenders is
that punishment should not be excessive. Id Punishment must be tempered by humanity and a goal
of avoiding unfair and arbitrary use of power. Id.; see Kent Greenwalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions
andthe Eighth Amendment: ImplicationsofPowell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L.ReV. 927,938-39 (1969)
(discussing the underlying justifications for the state's power to punish). One of the justifications
generally given is based on the retributive theory that punishment is imposed because the actor is
morally blameworthy and hence deserves the punishment. Id. This justification for punishment should
be rejected, according to some commentators, because the criminal law cannot be a tool for punishing
moral wrong, and infliction of useless suffering, because it is somehow "deserved," is not a laudable
human objective. Id. However, the retributive theory as a limitation on the state's authority to punish
is more appealing as providing a basis for the statement that punishment of innocent persons is
wrong, and that punishment should not be excessive in relation to the crime. Id. A more acceptable
justification for the state's power to punish is based on utilitarian notions, Id. Utilitarian theories
require that the punishment be justified by desirable consequences, such as deterrence of the offender
and others within the community, isolation and reformation of dangerous criminals, satisfaction of
society's demand for revenge, and reinforcement of community values. Id. See generally H.LA.
HART, PuNisHMENT AND RsPONSo n.riy 9-12, 22-24 (1968) (emphasizing utilitarian justifications
for punishment, but retributive theories in determining the severity of the sentence).
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Judicial interpretation has established that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause has application in four situations, each
of which implicates a rather distinct body of jurisprudence: (1)
Death penalty cases;4 (2) crimes involving an individual's status,
such as addiction to drugs;5 (3) conditions of incarceration;6 and
(4) disproportionate punishment.7 This Note focuses on the fourth
area: whether punishment must be proportional to, or "fit," the
crime.'
Although the law remains unsettled in each category of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, perhaps the most confused area
concerns the scope of the constitutional requirement that
punishment for noncapital cases be in proportion to the severity of
the crime.9 The Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, that a sentence

4. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
240 (1972) (per curiam) (declaring that capital punishment is invalid where the imposition of the
death penalty is disproportionate to the crime); cf. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890) (stating
that the death penalty is not prohibited as a cruel method of punishment unless the manner of
execution is inhuman or barbarous).
5. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962) (holding that a statute making
the addiction to narcotics a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment, is invalid under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments). The Supreme Court has refused to extend the Eighth Amendment
protections found in Robinson to a conviction of public intoxication. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
531-37 (1968); see Herbert Fingarette, The PerilsofPowell: In Search ofa FactualFoundationfor
the "Disease Concept ofAlcoholis'm," 83 HARV. L REV. 793, 794-97 (1970) (criticizing the dissent
in Powell for attempting to extend Robinson to public drunkenness); see also Greenwalt, supra note
3, at 928 (discussing the constitutional principles underlying the punishment of an individual for a
condition of drunkenness).
6. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
685 (1978) (noting that prison confinement is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment).
7. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,284 (1983) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits punishments which are of disproportionate severity to the crime).
8. The idea of punishment being "proportioned to the crime" could indicate that the
punishment is to be proportioned to the harm caused, the risk of harm, the moral fault of the
defendant, or all three considerations. See Note, supra note 3, at 636 (discussing the applicability of
these ideas in the concept of proportionality).
9. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, I11 S.Ct. 2680,2686 (1991) (plurality opinion of Scalia,
J.) (declaring that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee); id. at 2702
(Kennedy, 3., concurring) (finding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause contains a narrow
proportionality principle); id. at 2719 (White, ., dissenting) (declaring that the Eighth Amendment

contains a general proportionality requirement in the context of noncapital cases). The existence of
a so-called "'proportionality guarantee" has been clearly established in the context of death penalty
cases. See, e.g., Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970) (fimding that the death penalty
is not cruel and unusual per so, but is disproportional to the offense of rape, and therefore, violates
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of life imprisonment for an overtime parking violation would be so
disproportionate that it would violate the Eighth Amendment."
Such a punishment would be considered inhumane, in part because
commission of the crime does not indicate the need for such a
punishment, 1 ' and in part because society would consider such
punishment unjustified.12 The unsettled question is whether a
punishment, similarly inhumane for its excessiveness, but on a less
extreme scale than the overtime parking example, would violate the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The Supreme Court has left
it unclear whether there is a substantial proportionality guarantee
13
to the Eighth Amendment.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin v.
Michigan,4 it seemed settled that there was a substantial
guarantee that punishment be proportionate to the severity of the
crime in noncapital cases."5 A long judicial history indicating the
Supreme Court's belief in a proportionality guarantee culminated

the Eighth Amendment).
10. Harmelin, III S.Ct. at 2684 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263,274 n.11 (1980)). Justice Scalia traces this "'fanciful" overtime parking example from
a footnote in Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n. 11, to a footnote in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 n.2
(1982), and through the majority's holding in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 n.3 (1983). 1d.
11. See Note, supra note 3, at 635 (noting that severe penalties are not needed for an overtime
parking offense because the offender's acts do not lead to an inference that the offender may cause
future harm to society, and deterrence objectives could be served by less severe penalties).
12. See Note, supra note 3, at 635 (noting that society would consider such a harsh
punishment unjustified, even given strong evidence of the offender's criminal tendencies and danger
to the community, because the general acceptance of theories of free will and retribution require that
the offender actually commit the acts for which he is to be punished). See generally supra note 3 and
accompanying text (discussing theories of justification for punishment).
13. See Harmelin, 11 S. Ct. at 2680. Justice Seaia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
declared that the Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality guarantee. Id. at 2686 (plurality
opinion of Scalia, J.). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concluded that the
Eighth Amendment contained only a limited proportionality guarantee. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justices White, Blackmnn, Marshall and Stevens asserted that the Eighth Amendment
contained a viable proportionality guarantee. Id. at 2709 (White, J., dissenting). The phrases
".proportionality guarantee" and "proportionality principle" are used interchangeably in this Note
to indicate a constitutional requirement that punishment not be excessively severe in relation to the
crime committed.
14. 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991).
15. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,284-90 (1983) (declaring that the Eight Amendment's
proscription of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits sentences which are disproportionate to the
crime committed, in addition to illegal modes of punishment).
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in the 1983 decision of Solem v. Helm. 16 In that case the Court
was reviewing a life sentence imposed under a repeat offender
statute for uttering a "no account" check for $100.17 After
declaring that the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel
and unusual punishments forbids sentences of imprisonment
disproportionate to the crime committed, the Court in Helm set out
a three-part objective test to determine violations of the
proportionality guarantee. 8
In the first part of the test, the Helm Court looked to the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.' 9 According to the
majority, the gravity of the offense could be evaluated either by
examining the circumstances of the crime, comparing the
seriousness of the crime with the seriousness of other crimes, or
evaluating the nature of the crime.20 Next, the Court indicated that

16. Id.; see id. at 268-88 (imdicating that the Supreme Court had recognized a constitutional
principle of proportionality for almost a century).
17. Id. at 281.
18. Id. at 290-95. The three-part test required evaluation of the gravity of the offense in
contrast with the harshness of the penalty, an interjurisdictional comparison of sentences for the same
offense, and an intrajurisdictional comparison of sentence length for other crimes. Id. The test was
based upon principles which had been long recognized under Eighth Amendment proportionality
jurisprudence. Id. at 290. The use of these factors can be traced to an early Eighth Amendment
decision of the Supreme Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). There the Court
compared the sentence imposed on the defendant with sentences which could legally be imposed
within the same jurisdiction for similar crimes and crimes of greater severity. Weems, 217 U.S. at
380. The Court also compared sentences authorized in other jurisdictions for the same crime. Id.
19. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290.
20. Id. at 290-91. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-801 (1982) (evaluating the
circumstances of the crime to determine the gravity of the offense); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597-98 (1977) (comparing the seriousness of this crime with other crimes to determine the gravity
of the offense); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (examining the nature of the
crime to determine the gravity of the offense). The Helm Court noted several objective principles
which could be used to evaluate the gravity of an offense, including the incidence of violence in the
commission of the crime. Helm, 463 U.S at 293-94. The majority declared that the judiciary is
competent to judge the gravity of the offense for several reasons. Id at 292. First, it noted that there
are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of crimes. Id. (citing Peter H. Rossi, Emily
Waite, Christine E. Bose & Richard E. Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and
Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224, 237 (1974)). For example, violent crimes are
considered more serious than non-violent crimes. Id. at 292-93. Further, there are several generalities
upon which the courts can rely. Id. For instance, the magnitude of the crime may be relevant, and
generally lesser included offenses should not be punished more severely than the greater offense. Id.
Similarly, attempts are usually considered less serious than completed crimes, and an accessory after
the fact should not be subject to a more severe penalty than the principal. Id. Additionally, negligent
conduct should be considered less serious than intentional or reckless conduct, and the actor's motive
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it would be helpful to compare sentences imposed in the same
jurisdiction for other crimes. 2' If it can be determined that more
serious crimes are subject to the same or a lesser penalty, there is
an indication that the punishment at issue is excessive.2 Finally,
courts may also conduct a comparison of punishments imposed for
the same crime in other jurisdictions.'
After applying each of these factors, the Helm Court held that
the defendant's life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.-2
The Court characterized each of the defendant's felonies as
nonviolent, and subsequently overturned the sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole as violative of the
proportionality principle.'
Despite the holding in Helm, the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Harmelin v. Michigan 6 indicates that the law
in this area is again in a state of flux.27 A majority of the Court
in Harmelin refused to overturn a first-time offender's sentence of
life without possibility of parole for possession of 650 grams of
cocaine.' Justices Scalia and Rehnquist indicated that Helm

should be overruled, and denied that the Eighth Amendment
contains a proportionality guarantee in noncapital cases.29 While
disagreeing that Helm should be overruled, Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justices O'Connor and Souter, rejected the notion that the
Eighth Amendment requires strict proportionality between crime
and sentence." These three Justices found instead only a

may also be relevant. Id.
21. Helm, 463 U.S. at 291.
22. Id.; see Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795-96 (conducting a survey of the nation's death row
population to show that the defendant's crime of rape was considerably less severe than the others);
Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81 (invalidating the defendant's sentence on evidence that more serious
crimes were not punished as severely as defendant's crime).
23. Helm, 463 U.S. at 291-92. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97 (comparing sentence for rape
imposed in other jurisdictions with defendant's death penalty sentence); Weers, 217 U.S. at 380
(comparing sentences imposed by Congress for similar crimes with defendant's sentence).
24. Helm, 463 U.S. at 303.
25. Id. at 282, 303.
26. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
27. See supranote 13 (detailing the positions of the various members of the HarmelinCourt).
28. Harmeln, 111 S. Ct. at 2702 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
29. Id. at 2686 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.).
30. Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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prohibition against extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime."' Finally, Justice Kennedy's opinion
concluded that there existed a narrow proportionality principle in
noncapital cases, but rejected the contention that Helm required a
rigid three-part analysis.3 2 The four dissenters, Justices White,
Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall, filed three different opinions,
each supporting the notion of a proportionality guarantee and
embracing the analysis announced in Helm.33 While seven of the
nine members of the Supreme Court continued to recognize the
existence of a proportionality guarantee,' the opinions were
fractured in such a way that the case will limit the authority of
federal and state courts to review sentences for proportionality.35
Based on this fact, one could fairly conclude, as did Justice White,
that the plurality's analysis eviscerated the Eighth Amendment, and
left the guarantee an empty shell.36

31. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring),
33. Id. at 2711-12 (White, ., dissenting); id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
34. The Justices recognizing a proportionality guarantee were Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Souter, White, Blaclmun, Marshall and Stevens.
35. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, 105 HARV. L REV. 177, 251 (1991) (noting that
proportionality review was curtailed by the Harmelin plurality's requirement that courts give
deference to the legislature in determining the goals of criminal punishment and the length of
sentences necessary to attain those goals, and by failing to require courts to consider each of the
Helm factors). The fractured Harmelinopinions are also difficult for lower courts to apply. Id. While
courts applying proportionality review after Harmelin have been inconsistent in their evaluation of
the continuing vitality of the three-part test in Helm, they seem to agree that their power to overturn
sentences has been limited. See, e.g., United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106,1130-31 (3d Cir. 1991)
(analyzing the defendant's sentence after Harmelinrequires only a review to determine if the sentence
is grossly disproportionate; if there is no inference of gross disproportionality, it is inappropriate to
conduct intra and inter jurisdictional analysis); United States v. Banion, 943 F.2d 1422,1432-33 (5th
Cir. 1991) (declaring that proportionality review is limited, but requires analysis under the three
objective criteria cited in Helm); United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1195 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991)
(determining that the proportionality principle in Helm remains viable, although there is disagreement
as to its contours); United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1350 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating the court
did not need to enter the debate as to whether the Eighth Amendment forbids disproportionate or only
grossly disproportionate sentences because the sentence the defendant received was neither); United
States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396,408-09 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Supreme Court substantially
refined the analysis under Helm, and that while the scope has been limited, its contours are still
unclear).
36. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting).

226

1992 / Harmelin v. Michigan
Part I of this Note reviews the short Supreme Court history
regarding the proportionality guarantee in the context of noncapital
sentences.37 Part II summarizes the facts and the various opinions
of the Supreme Court Justices in Harmelin v. Michigan28 Part Im
discusses 9possible legal and social ramifications of the Harmelin
3
decision.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Origin of the Eighth Amendment and Early Supreme Court
Interpretation
The framers of the Constitution copied the wording of the
Eighth Amendment from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 4 0 and

adopted it with very little debate. 4 ' Some commentators observe
that the wording was simply considered constitutional

37. See infra notes 40-85 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 84-169 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
40. See Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment Challenges to the
Length of a CriminalSentence: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent to Preceden - 27
ARIZ. L REV. 25,27 (1985) (indicating that the requirement that punishment be proportionate to the
crime may be traced from the Magna Carta in 1215 through the English Bill of Rights in 1689);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-86 (1983) (tracing the phraseology of the Eighth Amendment
through its common law development); see also Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingard, Eighth
Amendment Beccaria and Enlightenment: An HistoricalJustificationfor Weems, 24 BUFFALO L
REV. 783, 806-08 (1975) (hypothesizing that the original authors of the phrase were influenced by
the European Enlightenment, a philosophical movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth century
which emphasized belief in the power of reason and inspired innovations in political, religious, and
educational doctrine). The political and social ideals of the European Enlightenment and early
American political experiences formed the underlying rationale for the Bill of Rights: the protection
of the private realm against government power. id. at 806. See generally Joseph E. Browdy & Robert
Salleman, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment; An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 36 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 846, 846 (1961) (following the prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishment" from the English Bill of Rights of 1688 and the Virginia Declaration of Rights
of 1776 to James Madison's 1789 draft of the constitutional amendments).
41. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,368-69 (1910) (noting that after one speaker
in the First Congress objected that the phrase was too indefinite, and another expressed concern that
it would abolish appropriate forms of punishment, the clause was adopted without further debate by
a large majority); see also John B. Wefing, Cruel and Unusual Punishment,20 SerON HALL L. REv.
478, 482 (1990) (indicating that there was almost no debate regarding the wording of the Eighth
Amendment); Baker & Baldwin, supra note 40, at 28 n.16 (commenting on the brief and
unenlightening debate regarding the amendment by the First Congress).
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"boilerplate." '42 The annals of Congress and studies by early
commentators substantiate the view that the framers directed the
clause at prohibiting harsh methods of punishment.43
Early judicial interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause is sparse. For close to one hundred years after
its adoption, the Eighth Amendment was rarely invoked, and
nineteenth century commentators believed the clause to be
obsolete.' When the Supreme Court first directly addressed the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment in the death penalty case of
Wilkerson v. Utah,45 it declared that the amendment's purpose was

42. See Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Crueland UnusualPunishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L.REV.839, 840 (1969) (citing L.ivy,ORINs op THE FurrH AMENDMENT,
411 (1968)) (indicating that the American Bill of Rights was adopted in a process which was less
than systematic and diligent).
43. 1 ANNALS OF CONe. 782-83 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (noting the limited debate regarding the
Eighth Amendment). See Granucci, supra note 42, at 842; Note, supra note 3, at 637 (noting that

commentary at the time of adoption generally indicated it was cruelty in the method of punishment
which was prohibited). One commentator has argued that the framers, who adopted the clause with
almost no discussion, misunderstood the English law they were applying. Granucci, supra note 42,
at 843-44. Prior to 1689, Great Britain had developed a general policy prohibiting excessiveness in
punishments, but it did not prohibit "barbarous" punishments that were proportionate to an offense.
Id. The framers may have thought the clause encompassed both prohibitions. Id.
44. See Granucci,supra note 42, at 842 (noting that commentators believed the clause to be
aimed at methods of punishment no longer in use, while arguments that the clause extended beyond
these barbaric practices to encompass excessive punishment were generally dismissed); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) (pointing out that the Court had previously had very little
occasion to determine the precise meaning of the Constitution, and on the few occasions it considered
the meaning of the phrase, it simply examined the particular punishment involved in light of the ideal
of prohibiting inhumane treatment); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890) (stating the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibited those punishments manifestly cruel, inhuman and
barbarous). Three dissenting Justices had advocated a proportionality principle in O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323 (1892), although the majority did not reach the question. Id at 340 (Field, J.,
dissenting). The three dissenting Justices stated that they believed the whole inhibition of the Eighth
Amendment was against punishment which is excessive. Id. at 340 (Field, J.,dissenting). The
majority had dismissed the case because, interalia,the Eighth Amendment did not then apply to the
states. Id. at 331-32. The Supreme Court first indicated that the Eighth Amendment applied to the
states in Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), and held that it did in Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). It should be noted that some states had not recognized a
proportionality guarantee in their own constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.
See, e.g., State v. Peters, 430 P.2d 382, 385 (1967) (declaring that the state constitutional ban on
cruel and unusual punishment applied to form, rather than duration of prescribed punishments).
45. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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to prohibit methods of punishment that involved unnecessary
cruelty.

46

By 1910, however, the Supreme Court had expanded its view
of the Eighth Amendment to apply to both the method and the
length of the punishment sentence. In Weems v. United States,47
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment prohibited a fifteen year
sentence of cadena temporal--aform of punishment involving hard
and painful labor, chaining the prisoner's hands and feet, and
deprivation of basic civil rights--for the crime of falsifying public
documents." The Weems Court overturned the sentence, declaring
that it was a precept of justice that the punishment must be in
proportion to the offense.49 While the Weems majority
acknowledged that the legislature was given the constitutional
power to define crimes and determine their punishment, the Court
declared that it had a duty to review statutory sentences to
determine whether they violated the Eighth Amendment."0 After
evaluating the severity of the penalty for the offense, the Court
employed a balancing approach, weighing the defendant's
punishment against the punishments imposed in other jurisdictions

46. Id; see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (stating the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause applies to punishments which are inhuman and barbarous, such as burning at the
stake or crucifixion). The Kemmler Court did not find the defendant's sentence of death by shooting
to be unnecessarily cruel Id.
47. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
48. Id. at 364-65 (commenting that the defendant had been convicted for a strict liability
offense, and that all that was needed to constitute a violation of the law was a false entry on a public
document). The Court in Weems was interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, PHIL. CONST. art. Ill § 1(19), which was verbatim to the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and was held to have the same meaning. Id. at 367
(citing Kemper v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Serra v. Mortiga, 204 U.S. 470 (1907)). The
Supreme Court has since confirmed that the Weems Court applied the same analysis as would apply
under the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286-88 (1983).
49. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. But see Herbert C. Packer, Making the PunishmentFitthe Crime,
77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1964) (arguing that the special facts of Weems did not lend
themselves well to a general pronouncement on the proportionality principle, and hence the opinion
fails to declare the criteria relevant to the guarantee).
50. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378-79 (noting that the only limitations on the legislature's judgment
were constitutional ones, which must be announced by the judiciary); see Note, What is Crueland
Unusual Punishment, 24 HARv. L REV. 54, 55 (1910-11) (declaring unwarranted a fear of judicial
overreaching because of the limitations placed on the Court to declare a punishment disproportionate).
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for comparably serious crimes, noting that more serious crimes
were not punished as heavily. 51 The Court found that the sentence
imposed on this particular defendant was cruel in its excessive
length of imprisonment and in the conditions which accompanied
52
the imprisonment.
The most significant aspect of the Weems decision was the
Court's insistence that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment was
not static, but must be constantly re-evaluated to meet changing
social conditions. 53 The Court stated that the Eighth Amendment
may be "progressive and acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by humane justice." 54 This idea was echoed
in Trop v. Dulles.55 In Trop, the defendant was convicted of
wartime desertion and punished by deprivation of his
citizenship. 56 In holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
this punishment, the Court in Trop summarized its method for

51. Weems, 217 U.S. at 366,380 (noting in regard to the severity of the crime that while there
was no showing of fraud or intent to personally gain, the showing of a false entry resulted in being
confined for 12-20 years, while chained at the wrist and ankle, subjected to hard and painful labor,
and upon release, perpetually investigated by the authorities and an inability to move without written
permission). The Court pointed out that in the Philippines, several degrees of homicide, treason,

inciting to rebellion, conspiracy to destroy the government by force, robbery, and many other crimes
were not punished as severely. Id. at 380.
52. Id. at 377. The method which the Supreme Court used to invalidate the statute at issue,
which consisted of comparing the sentence under review to those adopted in the same and other
jurisdictions for similar crimes, was limited shortly thereafter by the Court's rejection of an Eighth
Amendment claim on the basis of pre-Weems dictum that "[u]ndue leniency in one case does not
transform a reasonable punishment in another case to a cruel one." Badders v. United States, 240

U.S. 391, 394 (1916) (citing Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903)). See Note, supra note
3, at 640 (concluding that the Badders opinion caused the proportionality principle announced in
Weems to remain largely abstract, and the guarantee rarely resulting in a sentence being declared
invalid). Due to the difficulty of defining "cruelty," some courts maintained that no sentence within
the limits of legislative authorization could be considered cruel and unusual. Id.at 640-41. Generally,
judicial invalidation was reserved for sentences so disproportionate to the offense that the court could
find that the punishment shocked the moral sense of reasonable people. Id at 641 (citing Weber v.
Commonwealth, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946)).
53. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. See generally Note, supra note 50, at 55 (approving of the
Weems interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as keeping pace with the increasingly enlightened
views of society).
54. Wee=s, 217 U.S at 378.
55. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Supreme Court did not address the progressive aspect of the
Eighth Amendment in the intervening 40 years between the decision in Weems and the decision in
Trop.
56. Id. at 87-88.

230

1992 / Harmelin v. Michigan
interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.57 The
Court asserted that evolving standards of decency, developed as a
society matures, define the scope of the amendment. 8 The dignity
of man represented the interest protected by the clause. 59 After
declaring that loss of citizenship represented a more primitive form
of punishment than torture, the Trop Court reversed the defendant's
sentence as excessive."
The "evolving standards of decency" doctrine announced in
Trop remains widely accepted.61 A brief look at the history of
punishment may provide some explanation for its acceptance.
Without an evolutionary theory of what constitutes acceptable and
legitimate punishment, the Eighth Amendment would provide little
modem protection.62 Many punishments which were considered

57. Id. at 100-01.
58. Id. at 101.
59. Id.
60. Id. To support its assertion that loss of citizenship is a primitive and forbidden form of
punishment, the Court pointed out that denationalization represents the total destruction of the
individuas status in an organized society and strips the citizen of his political existence. Id. at 10102. The denationalized individual has lost the right to have rights. Id.
61. See Wefing, supra note 41, 483-84 (noting that virtually all members of the Supreme
Court continue to recognize the evolving standards of decency doctrine); see, e.g., Goss v. Bomar,
337 F.2d 341, 342 (6th Cir. 1964) (stating that the scope of the phrase is not static); United States
ex rel. Bongiomo v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 980 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd 146 F.2d 349 (1945), cert
denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945) (declaring that the Eighth Amendment is progressive, and does not
merely prohibit cruel punishments known in 1689 and 1787, but may acquire a wider meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice); see also Walter J. Gorski, Eighth
Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment; A Vehicle for Reappraisingthe Application of the
CriminalLaw to the Individual,40 CONN. B. J. 521, 523 (1966) (citing Weems for the proposition
that to be viable the Eighth Amendment must be capable of application beyond the specific evils
originally sought to be addressed); Note, supra note 3, at 638 (concluding that the task of defining
standards of decency has fallen to the courts, who perform the function primarily by determining
attitudes actually prevailing in society). For criticism of the "'evolving standards of decency' test,
see John C. ShawdeJurisprudentialConfusion in Eighth AmendmentAnalysis, 38 U. MAM L. REV.
357, 371 (1984) (charging that changing standards are unknowable standards, thus impairing the
legitimacy of the Court's moral decisions); The Supreme Court 1990 Term, supra note 35 at 253
(citing Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. dIN. L. REv. 849, 862-63 (1989))
(arguing that an evolutionary approach to constitutional interpretation is flawed because once justices
have abandoned the original meaning of the Constitution as their guiding interpretive principle, there
is no neutral way to replace it).
62. See, e.g., Note, supra note 50, at 55 (finding it unlikely that the Eighth Amendment was
aimed only at abuses which had become obsolete almost 200 years before its adoption); Arthur J.
Goldberb & Alan Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,83 HARv. L. REv.
1773, 1782 (1970) (declaring that enlightened standards of decency must prevail if the Eighth
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permissible at the time of the English Bill of Rights of 1687 would
surely be considered cruel and unusual punishment today. 63 To
provide protection, a modem court must be able to strike down a
particular punishment, for example drawing and quartering, as cruel
and unusual despite the fact that such a punishment would have
passed muster under the standards in effect, at the time of the
origination of the phrase.
Various commentators have suggested that once a court has
condemned a punishment, the condemnation should be permanent
and redefine the outer limits of the sentencing power of the
legislature."4 The Supreme Court, however, has never applied the
proportionality principle as broadly as these legal scholars have
suggested.65
The Weems decision has generally been interpreted by both
federal and state courts as holding not only that the mode of
punishment cannot be cruel and unusual, but also that the sentence
must be proportional to the crime committed.' However, courts
have only infrequently invalidated a sentence as excessive under
the proportionality principle.67 Deference to the judgment of the
legislature, and the early absence of clearly defined criteria to guide
Amendment is to retain any independent moral force).
63. Blackstone's eighteenth century list of permissible punishments included hanging, dragging
to the place of execution, disemboweling alive, beheading, quartering, public dissection, burning alive

(for female felons), dismembering, cutting off the hands and ears, slitting the nostrils, and branding
the hand or cheek. 4 W. BLACKSToNE, COMmETARmms ON THE LAw oF ENOr.M
N 1510-11 (r.
Cooley & L Andrews 4th Ed. 1899).

64. See Baker and Baldwin, supra note 40, at 27 (declaring that once the community's
morality has condemned a punishment and it is incorporated into the constitutional morality, the
punishment cannot be re-implemented). But see Wefing, supra note 41, at 482 (implying the
statement by Baker and Baldwin represents a hope more than a rule). Wefing notes that the Supreme
Court's approach in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), indicates that the Court can turn
back the clock with regard to prevailing standards of decency. Welfing, supra note 41, at 484. But

see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 368-69 (noting that the Eighth Amendment analysis should
not be confined to prohibitions outlawed in the eighteenth century; rather the correct test should be
both "flexible and dynamic," looking to modern society's conceptions of decency through objective

criterion).
65. See Baker and Baldwin, supra note 40, at 27.
66. Note, Sentencing - Objective CriteriaMust Be Used in Evaluating Proportionalityof
Sentence, Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 1003 (1983), 14 SEtN HALL L REV. 1004, 1004 (1984); Note,
supra note 3, at 640.
67. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962);

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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a review of proportionality contributed to this judicial restraint.68
There were fewer opportunities for application of the guarantee
before incorporation of the Eighth Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment, and lower federal courts seemed to confuse the
Weems issue with the nonconstitutional question of appellate
sentence review. 6' Finally, lower court judges may have been
unsure as to how to proceed because of the ambiguities in the
Weems majority opinion and Justice White's vigorous dissent.7"
A novel application of the Eighth Amendment led to the
invalidation of a ninety-day sentence for addiction to narcotics in
Robinson v. California.7 The Court in Robinson looked to
contemporary human knowledge to find the sentence invalid for the
"offense" of addiction, a condition which the Robinson Court
described as an illness.72 The Court noted that although
imprisonment for ninety days is not cruel and unusual in the
abstract, the disease of addiction should not be subject to a criminal

68. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 378-79 (disclaiming that the court has a right to approve or
disapprove the expediency of the laws or the right to make re-evaluate the legislative judgment as
to what is a crime and how it should be punished, unless the legislature runs afoul of the
Constitution); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the courts with
regard to determining correct punishment for crimes); supranote 49, 52 (concluding that the Weems
opinion did not provide sufficient information as to the proper criteria to be used in proportionality
review, and explaining that the Supreme Court's decision in Badders may also have resulted in the
lower courts' over sensitivity to judicial concerns). See generally Note, supra note 3, at 640-41
(noting that most courts adopted an attitude of great restraint when reviewing a sentence for
proportionality).
69. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 40, at 31 nJ38 (citing Edwards v. United States, 206
F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1953); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 344 U.S.
838 (1952); United States v. Corcey, 151 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 794 (1956);
Kachnic v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930); Bailey v. United States, 284 F. 126 (7th Cir.
1922)) (explaining the reasons for the unenthusiastic response of lower courts to the Weems decision).
70. Baker & Baldwin, supra note 40, at 31 n.38 (citing Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth
Amendment ProportionalityAnalysis and the compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L.

& CIMINLOY 378, 385-86 (1980); Richard G. Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional
Aspects of the Burden of Proofand the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to
Sentencing Determinations,58 CoRNELm L REV. 51, 67 (1972); and Richard Chase Turkington,
UnconstitutionallyExcessive Punishments:An Examinationof the EighthAmendment andthe Weems
Principle,3 CruM. L. BUu.. 145, 149-50 (1967)) (noting that there were nineteen decisions between
the holding in Weems in 1910 and 1965 which invalidated sentences as violative of the
proportionality guarantee).
71. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
72. Id. at 666-67 & n.8 (citing LUnder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) for the

proposition that persons addicted to narcotics have a disease).
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sanction of imprisonment in an enlightened society. 73 By stating
broadly that the punishment was not related to the defendant's
actions, the Robinson decision was interpreted to have invoked the
use of a proportionality principle.7' Some commentators, however,
interpreted the Robinson holding to mean only that addiction, like
illness, may not be criminalized under the Eighth Amendment
regardless of the proportionality of the punishment. 75
In contrast to the Supreme Court's tentative approach regarding
the proportionality guarantee in cases involving excessive sentence
length, the Court has found a clear proportionality principle in
cases involving the death penalty." For example, the Supreme
Court has held that it is disproportionate, and therefore cruel and
unusual, to impose the death penalty for the rape of an adult
woman.' The Court has also invalidated as disproportionate a
death penalty sentence for murder where the conviction was

73. Id. at 667. The Court declared that "even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Id.
74. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287 (1962) (characterizing the Court's holding in
Robinson as resting on an application of the proportionality guarantee); see also Baker & Baldwin,
supra note 40, at 31-32 (asserting the Robinson Court invalidated the defendant's sentence under the
proportionality principle).
75. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 40, at 32 n.45 (noting that a possible narrow
interpretation of Robinson is that addiction may not be criminalized); see also Margaret Jane Radin,
The JurisprudenceofDeath:Evolving Standardsforthe Crueland UnusualPunishmentClause, 126
U. PA. L. Rev. 989, 994 (1978) (declaring Robinson to hold that because it is beyond the power of
the legislature to criminalize narcotic addiction, any punishment would be disproportionate); Martin
RL Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Excessive
Punishment Before andAfter Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DuKE LI. 1103, 1115 (1980) (stating that it
is not clear that the Robinson Court relied on the proportionality principle to invalidate the statute);
William Hughes Mulligan, Crueland UnusualPunishments: The ProportionalityRule, 47 FoRDHAM
L REv. 639,644 (1979) (declaring that addiction is an illness and may not be criminalized regardless
of the proportionality).
76. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977) (stating that the Eighth Amendment bars
punishments which are disproportionate to the offense); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(noting that punishment may not be excessive under the Eighth Amendment, which means it must
not involve unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and must not be grossly disproportionate to
the offense); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,288 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958)) (declaring that the Eighth Amendment's role is to guarantee that the state's power to
punish is exercised within the limits set by civilized standards). But see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S.
37, 45 (1984) (stating that the death penalty cases decided by the Supreme Court have not made
proportionality review a constitutional requirement).
77. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
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obtained under a felony murder statute.7" Finally, the Supreme
Court has declared that the death penalty constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment if.it is imposed without an individualized
determination of the appropriateness of the punishment to the crime
committed.79 These cases clearly establish the constitutional
validity of a proportionality review when the penalty imposed is
death. 80
Despite this impressive array of authority for proportionality
review, the Supreme Court has interpreted the death penalty
decisions in such a way that they are of limited assistance in
noncapital cases. 81 While the Court does not always draw a
distinction between death penalty and other cases,' the Supreme
Court has stated that punishment by death is different, not only in
degree but in kind, and should be treated differently than other
forms of punishment under the Eighth Amendment's
proportionality guarantee.83

78. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,788 (1982). In Enmund, the defendant did not do the
actual killing. Id. at 798. Moreover, there was no proof he had any intent to kilL Id.
79. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-90 (1976). This holding is particularly
interesting because the defendant in HarmeUn v. Michigan was similarly sentenced under a mandatory
scheme and unsuccessfully attempted to extend this "individualized determination doctrine" to his
noncapital case. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 n.1, 2702 (1991).
80. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)) (noting that
the analysis under Gregg for excessiveness is: (1) Whether the punishment makes a measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, or is nothing more than a purposeless imposition of
suffering; and (2) whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the offense).
81. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,272 (1980) (treating the proportionality cases as part
of the death penalty jurisprudence, rather than a generalized aspect of Eighth Amendment law, and
noting that the decisions in capital cases are "'of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality
of the punishment" in a noncapital case).
82. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
171-72 (1976)) (noting that the Court has not drawn a distinction between capital cases and
imprisonment cases when applying the proportionality principle); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S.
370, 374 & n.3 (1982) (per curiam) (conceding that a prison sentence could be constitutionally
disproportionate).
83. In Rumme4 the Court expressed the view that the proportionality principle analysis utilized
in the death penalty context was limited to that context and was of limited assistance in interpreting
the constitutionality of prison terms. Rumme4 445 U.S. at 272. The Court has never seriously
disputed the fact that the two lines of cases fall under separate lines of analysis. See Helm, 463 U.S.
at 289 (stating that it is true that the death penalty differs in kind from all other types of punishment
and that the analysis under capital punishment cases is not directly applicable to proportionality
questions in a noncapital context).
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Against the background of noncapital cases ranging from
Weems to Robinson, each indicating the potential for a successful
Eighth Amendment challenge to disproportionate sentence length,
the Supreme Court decided a disjointed trio of cases, each
addressing the issue of the proportionality guarantee." By failing
to overrule any prior precedent, and by reaching diverse results
with inconsistent modes of analysis, these three cases laid the
foundation for the Justices' divergence in Harmelin v. Michigan.85
A. Rummel v. Estelle
The .first of the proportionality guarantee trilogy regarding
excessive length of punishment was Rummel v. Estelle.86 William
J. Rummel was convicted of obtaining a small amount of money
by false pretenses, a felony under Texas law. 7 Since Rummel had
been previously convicted for two similar felonies, he was
sentenced under the state's recidivist statute to life in prison.8 In
an opinion by Justice Relnquist, the Supreme Court voted five to
four to reject Rummel's argument that his sentence should be
overturned on the basis of the Weems proportionality analysis."
Characterizing Weems as holding only that unorthodox, rather
than excessive, punishments were prohibited, the Court in Rummel
dismissed the notion that it had ever overturned a sentence on the
basis of an Eighth Amendment proportionality guarantee.' While
the Rummel Court did not completely reject the idea of a
potentially successful proportionality challenge, it noted that the
only successful challenges in that area turned on facts other than

84. The three cases addressing the proportionality guarantee were: Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
85. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
86. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).

87.

Id. at 266. The amount of money obtained by defendant Rummel was $120.75. Id.

88. Id. at 264. A recidivist statute imposes a penalty upon an individual for having been
convicted a number of times; the recidivist statute at issue provided that upon an individual's third
felony conviction, that individual should be sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.

89.

Id. at 285.

90. Id. at 277-300. Justice Stewart's separate concurring opinion did not reach this issue,
finding instead that the fact that the Texas recividist statute was constitutional on its face was
dispositive of the issue. Id. at 285 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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a claimed excessive length of punishment. 9 ' Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court's decision to
overturn the sentence in Weems was predicated on the fact that the
defendant was subjected to a bizarre and physically cruel
penalty. 2 Further, the Rummel majority concluded that the death
penalty cases did not provide support for a noncapital
proportionality guarantee, because the Supreme Court's review of
death penalty sentences focused particularly on the fact that the
penalty of death differs in kind from all other forms of
punishment. 93 The Court in Rummel concluded that death is
unique because it is totally irrevocable and absolutely renounces all
that our concept of humanity embodies.' The Court contrasted
the punishment of death with Rummel's punishment, which
consisted only of a restriction on his freedom.95 In addition, the
Rummel Court noted the fact that Rummel would be eligible for
parole in twelve years."
In contrast to the holding of the Weems majority that the Court
had the power and a duty to conduct a proportionality review, the
Rummel Court claimed that the Eighth Amendment did not
authorize courts to review sentences of imprisonment to determine
if they were proportional to the crime.' The Court in Rummel
declared that for crimes classifiable as felonies, legislative
prerogative alone dictates the length of sentence to be imposed."

91. See id. at 274 (noting that successful challenges to sentences based on disproportionality
have been exceedingly rare outside the context of capital punishment).
92. Id. at 274-75. In Weems, the Philippine government had imposed the harsh penalty of
cadena temporalfor the crime of falsifying a public document. Id.
93. Id. at 272.
94. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,306 (1972)) (noting the death sentence also
marks a rejection of rehabilitation of the criminal as the basic purpose of criminal penalty).
95. Id. at 280-81.
96. Id. at 281. The Court declared that even a slim possibility of parole works as a

distinguishing factor from cases in which parole is not offered. Id.
97. Id. at 274; see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910) (stating it is the
Court's strictly defined duty to review sentences when they exceed constitutional limitations); see
also supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of the holding in Weems).
98. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. The Court noted that the unanimous court in Badders v. United
States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), had dismissed a claim of disproportionality for 35 years and $7,000 in
fines for seven counts of mail fraud, claiming there was no ground for finding such a punishment
unconstitutional. Id.
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The Court qualified its position by adding in a footnote that the
proportionality principle might come into play in the hypothetical
and extreme example where a state made overtime parking a felony
punishable by life imprisonment." The Court recognized that a
limited judicial role could exist, based on sufficiently limited
objective factors, but declared that criteria such as the lack of

violence or the small sums at stake were not objective and
therefore inappropriate as a basis for review."° In short, it
appears that the Rummel majority concluded that the length of
sentences of imprisonment is purely a matter of legislative
discretion, and that the Court has very little power under the Eighth
Amendment to review the legislature's determination. 1
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Rummel found the
proportionality guarantee to be an inherent element of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.1°2 The Rummel dissent stated
that the Constitution required the Court to measure the relationship
between the nature and the number of offenses committed, and the
severity of the punishment inflicted upon the offender. 3 This
measurement, according to Justice Powell, should rest on three
objective factors: The nature of the offense, comparisons between
jurisdictions of sentences imposed for the same crime, and an
intrajurisdictional comparison of sentences imposed for other
crimes."' Justice Powell applied these factors, and" found
Rummel's life sentence to be disproportionate to his crime of

99. Id.at274n.11.
100. Id. at 275.
101. See id. at 274 (stating that legislative prerogative dictates the length of prison sentences
for felonies, so that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is not merely formed by the subjective views

of the individual justices).
102. Id. at 285 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens also joined the
dissent.
103. Id at 288 (Powell, ., dissenting). The dissent found the majority's suggestion that the
proportionality principle was less applicable to noncapital punishment to be without support under
the Eighth Amendment. L (Powell, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell cited Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910),
as the case law underlying his three-part test Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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obtaining money by false pretenses. 05 Justice Powell focused on
the nonviolent nature of Rummel's offenses, and the small amount
of money involved."° The opinion also concluded that the Texas
recidivist statute was unusually harsh; the majority of state courts
and the federal system rejected a life sentence as punishment for
three nonviolent felonies."° Finally, Justice Powell also noted
that within the Texas scheme, it was clear that offenders who
commit serious, violent crimes could receive much lighter
sentences than Rummel had received for his nonviolent, relatively
minor offense.0 8 Consequently, according to Justice Powell,
Rummel's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. 9
The Rummel dissent disagreed with the majority that review of
sentences violated principles of federalism, or would interfere
excessively in state sentencing schemes.1 10 The dissent believed

that a determination of whether a particular sentence runs afoul of
constitutional limits was within the Court's constitutional function
under Article I." 1

105. Id. at 300-03 (Powell, J., dissenting). Significantly, the majority had dismissed as
speculative the comparison of sentences for other crimes within the jurisdiction, and had pointed out
the complexity of any attempt at an interjurisdictional analysis. Id. at 281, 282 n.27 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). These factors later formed the basis of the three-part analysis approved by the majority
in Solem v. Helm, 263 U.S. 277, 290-95 (1983). The first objective factor advocated by the dissent
was the relative severity or pettiness of the crime committed. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The majority responded to this segment of the dissentfs test by stating that the pettiness
of a crime could not be a reviewing factor, because it did not necessarily reflect the strength of
society's interest in deterrence. Id. at 276 (Powell, L dissenting). Both interjurisdictional and
intrajurisdictional comparisons, the second and third objective factors, were also rejected by the
Rummel majority as contrary to the concepts of federalism and legislative prerogative. Id. at 282.
106. Rumme4 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, ., dissenting).
107. Id. at 296-300 (Powell, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 300-03 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 300, 303 (Powell, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 303 (Powell, ., dissenting) (noting that while the Constitution recognizes the
autonomy of the states in a number of areas, it also compels the states to conduct those activities
within federal constitutional limits). Proportionality review, according to the dissent, simply enforces
an obligation upon the states which was created by the Constitution. Id. (Powell, L, dissenting).
111. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936)
(holding that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and that all legislation must conform
to its principles).
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B. Hutto v. Davis
The second opinion in the proportionality guarantee trilogy,
Hutto v. Davis, 1 2 rejected a claim of excessive length of
13
punishment under the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment.
Davis was convicted of possession of approximately $200 worth of
marijuana with the intent to distribute,"" and was sentenced to
forty years in prison as authorized under Virginia law." 5 After a
habeas corpus appeal, the district court and court of appeals applied
several of the objective factors advocated by the Rummel dissent,

and agreed with the defendant that his sentence was grossly
disproportionate to his crime, and held that the sentence violated
the Eighth Amendment." 6 The United States Supreme Court
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the holding in
Rummel, and the court of appeals again affirmed the district court's
7
holding and analysis."
On its second review of the case, the Supreme Court admonished
the court of appeals, stating that the lower court had failed to heed
its decision in Rummel which had established the proposition that
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences

should be exceedingly rare." 8 The Supreme Court in Davis
asserted that federal courts should be reluctant to review

112. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
113. Id. at 372.
114. Id. at 371.
115. Id.At the time of Davis conviction, state law authorized prison terms of five to forty
years and fines up to $25,000 for each of Davis' offenses. Id.
116. Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444,453 (1977), aff'd on rehearingsub nom., Davis
v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153, 154 (4th Cir. 1979), remanded sub nom., Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947
(1980), affid on remand(by an equally divided court) sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th
Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam). The district court
relied on the four factors set forth in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), in reaching this
conclusion. Zahradnick,432 F. Supp. at 453. That test included examination of. (1) The nature of
the offense; (2) the legislative purpose for the punishment; (3) the punishment within the jurisdiction
for other offenses; and (4) the punishment actually imposed within the jurisdiction for the same or
similar offenses. Id.
117. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981).
118. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 372.

240

1992 / Harmelin v. Michigan
legislatively-mandated prison terms. 1 9 After reversing the lower
court's holding that Davis' punishment was invalid as cruel and
unusual, the Court noted that unless anarchy was to prevail, lower
federal courts must follow the precedents of the Supreme Court
regardless of how misguided they considered them to be.12
The Davis Court affirmed Davis' sentence without reviewing
the proportionality of the punishment.'
The per curiam opinion
indicated that review of sentence length had been precluded as a
mere subjective determination by the holding of Rummel." The
Davis Court quoted Rummel as stating that for felonies, the length
of sentence actually imposed was purely a matter of legislative
prerogative. ' 3 The Court also stated that 'in Rummel it had
implicitly disapproved of the objective factor analysis used by the
district court to overturn Davis' sentence. 124 First, the Court in
Davis rejected the district court's reliance on the presence or
absence of an element of violence, stating that the nature of the
offense did not always affect the strength of the public interest in
deterring that particular crime. "zSecond, the Court, without
necessarily rejecting the test, dismissed as subjective the district
court's analysis of the purposes behind the statute and the existence
of less restrictive means of effectuating those purposes. 26 The
district court had reached no conclusion on this factor, but it had
noted that Davis had only possessed nine ounces of marijuana, and
implied that deterrence of possession of such a small amount could

119. Id. at 374 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,274 (1980)). While Rummel's sentence
was not mandated by state law, it was within the limits authorized by the legislature. Id.6 at 371.
120. Id. at 375.
121.

Id.

122.

Id. at 373 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980), for the proposition that

Eighth Amendment judgments must not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of the
justices). The Huto majority concluded that because the excessiveness of a prison term was always
a subjective determination, the review should not be undertaken. Id.
123. Id. at 373 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)).

124. Id. The district court relied on four factors suggested in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). Id.
125. Id. at 373 n.2.

126. Id. at 373-74 n.2.
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be obtained by shorter prison sentences." 7 The Davis Court
indicated that method of analysis, with its focus on the amount of
marijuana involved, had been implicitly rejected by the Rummel
Court's reasoning. 12 The Court stated that an acknowledgement
that, at some point, the state could impose a life sentence was a
virtual concession that the lines to be drawn are subjective, and are
therefore the province of the legislature rather than the courts.129
Third, a comparison of sentence lengths for the same crime in other
jurisdictions was rejected, as it had been in Rummel, because
without a constitutionally imposed uniformity, which would be in
opposition to notions of federalism, some state will always treat
this particular offender more severely than would other states."'0
Finally, the Court in Davis rejected the fourth factor, which
required a comparison of the particular sentence with the length of
sentences generally within the jurisdiction, because the Court had
noted in Rummel that each crime implicates a different societal
interest, making this type of comparison inherently speculative. 31
The Davis majority did not agree with the dissent's claim that the
review process represented a reasoned analysis based on objective
132
factors.
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment of the Court, noting
that although he thought the sentence Davis received was unjust
and disproportionate, the matter had been effectively concluded by
the Supreme Court's decision in Rummel. 133 Justice Powell noted

127. Id. at 371; see Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 452 (1977) (finding that the
purpose of the statute, to stop the sale of an only questionably harmful drug, could be served by a
significantly less severe punishment).
128. Huuo, 454 U.S. at 373 n.2.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 370. The Court did admit the "irresistible counter example" of the life sentence for
overtime parking, and noted that "[s]uccessful challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences should be exceedingly rare." Id. at 374. Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring
opinion that neither the majority in Rummel nor the majority in Davis had denied the existence of
a proportionality principle. Id. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring); see Baker & Baldwin, supra note 40,
at 37 (concluding that the Supreme Court conceded a limited role for federal judges in reviewing
sentence length for proportionality).
133. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 375 (Powell, I., concurring).
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that the Rummel Court did not reject the proportionality principle
long settled by prior cases, but it did take a restricted view of that
principle." While the limits of prison sentences are normally a
matter of legislative prerogative, appellate systems do have a
responsibility, expressed in the proportionality principle, to review
grossly disproportionate sentences that are manifestly unjust.13
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
13 6
dissented from the majority's summary disposition of the case.
Believing that the holding of Rummel was limited to review of
recidivist statutes, the dissent claimed in Davis that the majority
had made a serious and improper expansion of Rummel. 37 The
Davis case, the dissent argued, represented one of those
exceedingly rare situations where, primarily because of
interjurisdictional inconsistency, the punishment imposed violated
the proportionality principal. 3 The majority's opinion, according
to the dissent, was inconsistent in admitting a potential for
successful proportionality claims, yet failing to clearly define the
factors it would use in the analysis of such a case.' 39
Commentators apparently agreed with this criticism, noting that the
Davis decision left the law in an unsatisfactory state, and the lower
courts badly in need of guidance.140
C. Solem v. Helm
The final case in the proportionality trilogy was also the first
Supreme Court case to unequivocally declare that a noncapital
sentence violated the proportionality principle.14 ' The case arose

134. Id. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring).
135. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 382-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan characterized the holding in
Rummel as finding that when there is an overwhelming state interest in deterring habitual offenders,
the state is not precluded by the Eighth Amendment from imposing what might otherwise constitute
a disproportionate prison sentence. Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Baker & Baldwin, supra note 40, at 38.
141. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,290 (1983). Justice Powell, who wrote the Rummel dissent

and the Hutto concurrence, wrote the opinion for the Helm Court.
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after Jerry Helm had been convicted of uttering a "no account"
check for $100.142 This crime ordinarily carried a maximum
143
punishment of five years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fime.
However, because he had a criminal record which included six
prior felony convictions, Helm was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist
statute. 1" Helm contended that the length of the sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment as applied to his
crimes. 14' The United States Supreme Court, in a detailed and
carefully drawn decision, agreed that Helm's sentence violated the
146
Eighth Amendment.
Without overruling prior cases, but in dramatic contrast to the
holdings of Rummel and Davis, the Supreme Court in Helm
declared that the Eighth Amendment contained a proscription of
disproportionate sentences, which was deeply rooted in the
common law and was implicitly adopted by the framers of the
Eighth Amendment.147 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
distinguished Helm from Rummel based on the fact that there was
no possibility of parole (which had been available for the defendant
in Rummel but not for the defendant in Helm) to lessen the severity
of the defendant's sentence."'4
The Helm Court declared that there was no basis for the state's
assertion that the proportionality principle did not apply to
noncapital sentences.149 The majority acknowledged that prior

142.

Id. at 281. A no account check is uttered when a check is drawn on a financial institution

by an individual who knows he does not have an account with that fimancial institution and the
individual acts with intent to defraud. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-41-1.2 (1979).
143. Helm, 463 U.S. at 281; see S.D. CODIFmD LAws ANN. § 22-6-1(6) (1978).
144. Helm, 463 U.S. at 281. Helm's prior record consisted of three convictions for third-degree

burglary, obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and third-offense driving while
intoxicated. Id. at 279-80.
145. Id. at 283.
146. Id. at 303.

147. Id. at 284-86.
148. Id. at 301-03.
149. Id. at 288. The Court found no textual basis for this argument, noting the Eighth
Amendment imposes *'parallel limitations" on bail, fmes and other punishments. Id. at 288-89; see
generally supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (discussing proportionality jurisprudence in the
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cases had declared that successful challenges to the proportionality
principal, outside the context of capital punishment, would be
exceedingly rare. 150 The Helm Court held, however, that the
decisions in Rummel and Davis did not lead to the conclusion that
the proportionality analysis is wholly inappropriate for noncapital
1
cases.

15

In defining the appropriate analysis for noncapital
proportionality challenges, the Court in Helm emphasized the
importance of objective criteria.' 52 Justice Powell relied on a set
of factors which had been recognized in past cases,'53 and
included: (1) A comparison of the gravity of the offense and
harshness of the penalty; (2) a comparison of the sentence with

sentences for the same offense in other jurisdictions; and (3) a
comparison of sentence
length for similarly severe crimes within
154
the same jurisdiction.
The Helm Court first noted that neither Helm's crime nor his
prior felony convictions were particularly grave, since most were
passive, nonviolent property crimes involving fairly small amounts
of money.15 Since life imprisonment without possibility of parole
was the most severe punishment available in South Dakota, the
Court found the sentence to be unnecessarily harsh.' The Helm
Court observed that in South Dakota, only the most serious crimes
were subject to mandatory life imprisonment, and that the sentence

context of sentences imposing the death penalty).

150. Helm, 463 U.S. at 289-90.
151. Id. at 290; cf Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (acknowledging the possibility
of a successful proportionality challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment for an overtime parking

violation).
152. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290.
153. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (outlining
objective factors to be used in reviewing a sentence for excessiveness).
154. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290-92. The Court noted that application of this analysis assumes that
the court is competent under Article I[[ to judge the gravity of the offense, and to compare sentences.
Id. at 292, 294.
155. Id. at 296. Helm's prior felonies included three convictions for third-degree burglary, one
conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses, one grand larceny, and a third offense driving
while intoxicated. Id. at 279-80.
156. Id. at 311-12.
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was not even authorized for a large group of serious offenses.'57
The Court also noted that Helm would have received a less severe
punishment in every other state.'58
The Court distinguished Helm from Rummel by noting that the
South Dakota system was fundamentally different from the penal
system declared valid by the Court in Rummel.'59 While Rummel
had a potential for parole under the Texas system, Helm's sentence
contained no possibility of parole and no possibility that he would
be released during his life, except in the unlikely instance of a
commutation from the state governor."e This difference formed
a factual distinction between the two cases which allowed the
Supreme Court to avoid the problem of overruling prior case
precedent. 161
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist and
O'Connor, dissented, arguing that the majority had discarded
concepts of stare decisis and distorted the proportionality guarantee,
which the dissent believed to be appropriate only in the review of
capital cases.' 62 The Helm dissent further stated that the
majority's opinion had seriously trespassed on the authority of the
states to perform the legislative function of determining punishment
for state crimes.163 Chief Justice Burger noted that the Helm
Court's analysis could not rationally be reconciled with Rummel,

157. Id. at 314. The Court noted that only a handful of crimes are necessarily punishable by
life imprisonment in South Dakota: murder, and after a second or third conviction, treason, firstdegree manslaughter, futst-degree arson, and kidnapping. Id. at 298. A second group of offenses
permitted life imprisonment at the discretion of the sentencing judge, including first-degree
manslaughter, first-degree arson, first-degree rape on a second or third offense, treason, kidnapping,
attempted murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and any felony after three prior
offenses. Id. at 298-99. The Helm Court noted that a life sentence is not authorized for a third offense
of heroin dealing or aggravated assault. Id. at 299.
158. Id. at 314-15. The Court noted that only in Nevada would a life sentence without parole
even be possible. Id.
159. Id. at 301.

160. Id.
161.
162.
163.
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Id. at 304 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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yet the opinion did not purport to overrule Rummel."6 The
dissent admitted a limited proportionality principle, 165 but
concluded that Rummel controlled the case and that the Supreme
Court had
previously rejected the analysis adopted by the Helm
166
Court.
The state of the law after the Supreme Court's five to four
decision in Helm was far from clear. Rummel and Davis had
rejected the three-part objective analysis which Helm had
embraced. 67 The Helm Court had declared in broad terms the
existence of a proportionality guarantee, while the Rummel and
Davis decisions had only admitted the possibility under the bizarre
fact pattern of a life sentence for overtime parking.1 61 Thus, while
the Helm decision was sweeping in its language, the failure of the
majority to overrule the Rummel and Davisdecisions made the case
easy to limit to its facts. 69 Further, by adopting an analysis
specifically rejected in prior precedent, many commentators
concluded that the Helm Court left no clear guidance to the lower
courts for dealing with proportionality challenges to sentence
for the
length. 7 ' This spectrum of case authority paved the way 171
disjointed opinions of the Court in Harmelin v. Michigan.

164.

See id. at 304,310 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that the Rummel Court had rejected

as subjective the very analysis adopted by the Court in Helm, and stating that Helm could not be
squared with Rummel).
165. See id. at 320 n.3 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (stating that the Eighth Amendment might
apply to those rare cases "where reasonable men cannot differ as to the inappropriateness of a
punishment").
166. Id. at 319.
167.

See supra notes 84-138 and accompanying text (discussing Rummel and Hutto).

168. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 288 (citing the Hutto and Rummel overtime parking footnotes for
the proposition that the Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly disproportionate punishments).
169. Note, supra note 65, at 1026.

170. Id. But see Baker & Baldwin, supra note 40, at 48 (stating that the Helm decision has
established consistency in an otherwise troubled area of the law).
171.

111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991).
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I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
Harmelin was convicted of possession of 672 grams of cocaine
(approximately 1.5 pounds)," and although this was Harmelin's
first offense, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. " This sentence was mandated by state
statute, and the trial court was thus unable, under the terms of the
statute, to consider any mitigating factors in determining the
defendant's sentence. 74
The Michigan State Court of Appeals affirmed Harmelin's
sentence, and rejected his claim that a mandatory term of life in
prison without possibility of parole was "cruel and unusual" under
the Eighth Amendment. 75 Harmelin then argued before the
United States Supreme Court that his sentence violated the
proportionality principle.'76 He further asserted that the sentence
was cruel and unusual because the sentencing judge was statutorily
required to impose the sentence, and could not take into account
the particular circumstances of the crime or the criminal.'
The Supreme Court affirmed Harmelin's sentence, although the
Justices fractured in their opinions over almost every major issue
in the case. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter, agreed with the court of
appeals that Harmelin's sentence was not cruel and unusual simply
because the sentence was mandatory under the Michigan
statute. 78 Justices Scalia and Rehnquist voiced the opinion that
Helm should be overruled on the basis that there is no

172.
173.

Id. at 2684.

Id.
174. Id. at 2684 n.1; see Mica. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403(2Xa)(i) (West Supp. 1992)

(providing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for possession of 650 grams or more of "any
mixture containing a schedule two controlled substance"); id § 333.7214(a)iv) (West Supp. 1992)
(defining cocaine as a schedule two controlled substance).
175. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 80 (1989).
176. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2702 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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proportionality guarantee for noncapital sentences, and that
consequently Harmelin's sentence should be affirmed. 79 Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter also rejected Harmelin's claim that
his sentence was disproportionate to his crime, although the
Justices affirmed the existence of a proportionality guarantee, and
approved a modified Helm analysis. 8 ° The four dissenting
Justices argued that the members of the plurality were rejecting the
precedent set by Helm in attempting to modify its three-part

test.18' Specifically, the dissenter's found that, under the Helm
test, the mandatory sentence imposed on Harmelin violated the
proportionality guarantee of the Eighth Amendment. 2
B. The Plurality Opinion of Justice Scalia
In Justice Scalia's view, the Eighth Amendment contained no
proportionality guarantee for noncapital sentences. 83 Therefore,
Harmelin's sentence could not be overturned as violative of ans4
Eighth Amendment prohibition of disproportionate punishmentl
Justice Scalia argued that the holding of Helm,18 5 declaring the
existence of a proportionality principle, and fashioning factors for
use in determining its violation, was incorrect and should be
overruled.18 6 In support of this argument Justice Scalia noted
several points. First, Justice Scalia concluded that the original
purpose of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
had been to prevent unusually cruel methods of punishment rather
than excessive prison terms.' 7 Second, Justice Scalia argued that

179. Id. at 2686.
180. Id. at 2702-03 (Kennedy, L, concurring).
181. Id. at 2713 (White, L, dissenting); see id. at 2719 (Marshall, L, dissenting) (application
of the proportionality principle recognized in capital and noncapital cases would have resulted in

finding the defendant's sentence unconstitutional); id. at 2720 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding the
defendant's sentence unconstitutional after an interjurisdictional comparison).
182. Id. at 2719 (White, I., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2686.
184. Id.
185. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
186. Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2686.
187. Id. at 2691. This conclusion was based on a detailed review of the history behind the
language contained in the text of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2686-91.
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early interpretation of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment"
by American courts and commentators was consistent with this
construction. 8 ' Third, Justice Scalia illustrated his view that the
holding of Helm represented a departure from the prior reasoning
and holdings of the Supreme Court in Eighth Amendment
proportionality cases.18 9 Finally, Justice Scalia asserted that
because stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional
precedent than to other Supreme Court pronouncements, the Court
should not hesitate to overturn the incorrect holding of Helm. 19
Justice Scalia examined the evolution of the language "cruel
and unusual" from the English Declaration of Rights of 1689
through its adoption into the United States Constitution.19 In his
opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized the general consensus among
commentators that the Eighth Amendment was enacted as a
prohibition against cruel and unusual methods of punishment. 1"
Following a detailed discussion of the meaning of the language at
English common law,' 93 Justice Scalia asserted that unless pure
incorporationism is to govern constitutional law, the crucial
question on which the Court must focus is not the common law
meaning, but rather the meaning that the framers of the

188. Id. at 2693,2695. 'Thisconclusion was based on an extensive review of the language and
early commentary on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Id. at 2691-99 (citing J. BAYARD,
A BRiEF xpOSITION Op THE CONSTITION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (2d ed. 1840); B. OLIVER,
TtHE Momrrs op AN AMERICAN CITZN 186 (1832); 2 i. KENT, COMMENTARI ON AMERICAN LAW
10-11 (1827); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTTUTON OF THE UNrrED STATES § 1896
(1833)).
189. Id. at 2684-86. Justice Scalia cited the holdings in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,274
(1982) and Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982) to illustrate his conclusion that prior
precedent rejected the existence of a proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment. Id.
190. Id. at 2686. As a general rule, the Supreme Court has declared that stare decisis is less
rigid for constitutional precedents than for other applications because the legislature has no
opportunity to respond to an incorrect constitutional ruling by the Supreme Court other than by
attempting to pass a constitutional amendment. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 & n.10 (1944).
191. Harnelin, 111 . Ct. at 2686-91.
192. Id. at 2687.
193. See id. at 2691 (concluding that the English cruel and unusual punishment's clause
probably was not meant to require proportionality in punishment).
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Constitution attributed to the language. 194 This framing of the
issue led to a detailed discussion regarding early interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment.'"
Justice Scalia made two observations prior to this discussion.
Justice Scalia first concluded that, because there were no common
law punishments in the federal system, the Eighth Amendment was
intended to operate as a check on legislatures.' 96 Justice Scalia
also observed that the text of the Constitution can be construed to
include a proportionality guarantee." 9 In his opinion, however,
Justice Scalia concluded, that the arguments against such a
19 8
construction foreclose the possibility of this interpretation.
Arguing that the failure to use the word "proportionality" was
significant, Justice Scalia pointed out that the term was explicitly
included in the provisions of several state constitutions, both before
and after the time of enactment of the Bill of Rights.' 99
Justice Scalia's analysis of early American interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment began by observing that the First Congress's
actions indicate a belief that the amendment prohibited certain
methods of punishment, such as torture."00 For example, the First
Congress imposed death by hanging as the penalty not only for
crimes such as treason and murder, but also for forgery of United
States Securities or running away with a ship or property worth
fifty dollars or more, while Thomas Jefferson's suggestion of
different length sentences for these crimes in his proposed Bill for

194. Id. In assigning this analysis the status of the "ultimate question," of course, Justice
Scalia may be accused of governing solely by original intent. See generally Antonin Scalia,

Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.L REv. 849 (1989) (defending the reliance on originalism
in constitutional analysis).
195.

See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2691 (concluding that the clause was designed to prohibit

particular methods of punishment).

196. Id.
197. Id. at 2692; see id. at 2692 n.6 (declaring that constitutional review requires not merely
a determination of what construction the text will bear, but rather to determine the most plausible

meaning).
198. Id. at 2692.
199. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the New Hampshire Constitution, adopted eight years before

ratification of the Eighth Amendment, and the Ohio Constitution, adopted twelve years after,
contained a prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and a separate requirement that
punishment be proportioned to the crime. Id.
200. Id. at 2694.
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Proportioning Crimes was rejected.2"' Justice Scalia noted that
state courts interpreting state constitutions with identical "cruel and
unusual punishments" clauses during the nineteenth century
contained no prohibition against
concluded that the language
disproportionate sentences. 2°2
Supreme Court cases prior to the Helm ruling, according to
Justice Scalia, provided an insubstantial basis for finding a
constitutional guarantee of proportionate punishment. 2 3 In fact,
Justice Scalia accused the Helm majority of mischaracterizing prior
case law and seizing upon unfortunate word choices in the Hutto
opinion in order to reach a finding that the proportionality principal
24
was rooted in constitutional jurisprudence. 0
According to Justice Scalia, mischaracterization of prior case
law in order to find the existence of a proportionality principle
occurred in four instances. 5 First, Justice Scalia noted that the
Rummel opinion had stated that "one could argue without fear of
contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes
concededly classified and classifiable as felonies ... the length of
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative. 26 The Court twisted this language in Helm,
according to Justice Scalia, when it focused upon the words "one
could argue." 2 7 In Justice Scalia's opinion, the Helm Court
seized upon this phrase to declare that the Court had simply meant

201. Id. (citing 1 WRriNrs o' THOMAS JEFFERSON 220-22,229-31 (A. Lipscomp ed. 1903)).
202. Id. at 2695 (declaring that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was intended only
to prohibit certain modes of punishment); see also id. (citing Barker v. People, 20 Johns 457 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1823), aff'd, 3 Cow. 686 (N.Y. 1824) (assuming that the Eighth Amendment applied to the
states, and concluding that proportionality was irrelevant).
203. Id. at 2686 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,274 (1980); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S.
370, 374-75 (1982)).
204. Id.
205. See id. at 2684 (discussing the ways in which the Helm Court, in Justice Scalia's opinion,
had mischaracterized case law).
206. Id. at 2685-86 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)).
207. Id. at 2686; see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,288 n.14 (1983) (characterizing the Court's
statement in Rummel as merely recognizing that the argument was possible, and then declaring that
to the extent the state made the argument in Helm, the Court found it meritless).
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that the argument was possible." 8 The Helm Court, he argued,
had announced that such an argument was meritless.' 9
Justice Scalia went on to state that case law had been twisted
in the Helm decision through the majority's use of the Rummel
Court's fanciful overtime parking footnote. 2" The original
version of the footnote, Justice Scalia pointed out, was a simple
statement suggesting the possibility that a proportionality principle
would not come into play in the extreme example of life
imprisonment for an overtime parking violation.2 ' The Davis
Court, Justice Scalia argued, imperceptibly expanded the footnote
by characterizing it as "noting... that there could be situations in
which the proportionality principle would come into play" such as
the overtime parking example.212 With this characterization, the
Helm Court viewed that language, inappropriately according to
recognition of a deeply rooted
Justice Scalia, as the most recent
213
proportionality jurisprudence.
The expansion of the observation in Rummel that
proportionality challenges to noncapital punishment "have been
extremely rare," into the remark in Davis that these challenges
"should
be exceedingly rare,"
constituted the third
misrepresentation of prior precedent according to Justice
Scalia. 214 Justice Scalia reasoned that the use of this language to
support an inference that gross disproportionality could, on
extremely rare occasions, be unconstitutional was incompatible with

208. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at2686.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2684; see supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the overtime parking

footnotes in Rummel and Davis). The Rummel footnote provided "[tihis is not to say that a
proportionality principle would not come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent
... if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." Rummel 445
U.S. at 274 n.ll. The Davis footnote stated that "there could be situations in which the
proportionality principle would come into play," such as the fanciful overtime parking example.
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 n.3 (1982).
211. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11).

212.
213.

Id. at 2685 (citing Davis, 454 U.S. at 374 n3 (per curiam)).
Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 263 U.S. 277, 286 (1983)) (stating that a proportionality

principle had been recognized by the Supreme Court for close to one hundred years).
214.

Id. (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272; Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374).
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the general tone of the Davis Court's decisive per curiam reversal
of a disproportionality holding.215
Justice Scalia's fourth and final finding of a twisting of the
constitutional jurisprudence in this area concerned the use of
Helm's three-part test which required a comparison of: (1) The
relative gravity of the offense weighed against the severity of the
sentence; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for similar
crimes; and (3) punishments imposed for the same offense in other
jurisdictions. 216 This test, noted Justice Scalia, had been
specifically proposed by the dissent, and rejected by the majority,

in Rummel and Davis; yet the Helm majority had employed it by
characterizing 21
the
prior holdings as indicating that no single factor
7
would control.
Justice Scalia next attacked the substance of the three-part Helm
test, and concluded that the standards used to measure a violation
of the proportionality principle were so inadequate that they
constituted an invitation to impose the Justices' subjective
values.218 With regard to the first factor, the inherent gravity of
the offense, he noted that this determination is invariably a
subjective one which varies according to the context and opinions
of the people who recognize a crime and declare its
punishment. 219 Individual opinion as to what constitutes a serious
crime, or even a crime at all, can vary enormously.220 Moreover,
standards change over time." For example, Justice Scalia

215.

Id. at 2685; see Hutto, 454 U.S. at 375 (rejecting a proportionality challenge to a sentence

of 40 years and a fine of $20,000 for possession and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana).
216. Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2686.
217. Id. Justice Scalia points out that the Court in Rummel and Davis explicitly rejected the
four-factor test found in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), which included the factors
relied upon by the Helm majority. Harmein, 111 S. Ct. at 2685 n.2, 2686.
218. Id. at 2697.
219. Id.

220. Id. at 2697-98 For instance, Justice Scalia pointed out that in Massachusetts sodomy is
punished more severely than assault and battery, whereas in several states, it is not unlawful at all.
Id. at 2697 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws §§ 272:34 (1988) (allowing a maximum of 20 years in prison
for sodomy); iii § 265:13A (1988) (allowing a maximum of two and one half years in prison for

assault and battery)). In Louisiana, assault with a dangerous weapon faces is punishable by the same
maximum prison term as the offense of removing a shopping basket from a store parking lot. Id. at
2697 (citing L. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:37, 14:68.1 (West 1986)).

221.

254

Id.
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pointed out that by today's standards, it may seem that the First
Congress punished disproportionatly by providing up to seven years
in prison and $1000 in fine for cutting off an ear, tongue, or limb
or putting out the eyes with intention to maim or disfigure, but
provided the death penalty for running off with a ship or vessel, or
any goods or merchandise worth fifty dollars or more.' Similar
examples of possible disproportionality can be found today; Justice
Scalia noted that assault by wounding carries the same penalty of
up to six months in prison as does unauthorized reproduction of the
"Smokey Bear" character.m Justice Scalia argued that although
both the First Congress and the current Congress may be acting
disproportionatly, there are no textual or historical standards for
making such a determination. 4
The difficulty in defining the gravity of an offense, Justice
Scalia argued, stems from the fact that this evaluation depends
entirely on subjective values and judgments.225 How severe an
offense one thinks possession of drugs is depends on how
threatening one believes drug use to be. 6 This subjectively
illustrates the problem associated with the second factor of the
Helm test: one cannot compare sentences for similarly grave
offenses within the jurisdiction if there are no guidelines by which
to determine the gravity of a given offense. 7 Therefore, Justice
Scalia proffered, courts will simply engage in subjective
comparisons." Further, according to Justice Scalia, even if
similarly grave offenses could be identified, the penalties will not

222. Id. at 2697-98 (citing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 8, 13, 1 Stat. 113).
223. Id. at 2698 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1988); iU § 707(b)(1988)).
224. Id.

225. Id.
226. Id. This argument is supported somewhat by the fact that three Supreme Court Justices

found that the possession of 650 grams of cocaine is a serious and violent crime, while four Justices
concluded that the crime was not exceptionally serious. Compare id. at 2706 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) with id. at 2717 (White, J., dissenting).
2271 Id. at 2698.
228. Id.
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necessarily be comparable since the objectives behind the
sentencing can and should vary."'
Justice Scalia similarly criticized the final factor of the threepart Helm test, interjurisdictional comparison of sentences for the
same crime, as an unnecessary interference with the state
legislature's legitimate functions.2' ° This comparison, Justice
Scalia argued, is unhelpful because the notion that sentences cannot
vary, even drastically, from state to state is inconsistent with the
ideals of federalism."1 Justice Scalia argued that the Eighth
Amendment is not a one-way rachet, and a temporary consensus
that a particular crime will be treated leniently does not fix a
permanent constitutional limit which disables the states from giving
effect to changing social conditions.3 2
Justice Scalia acknowledged in Hamelin that Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence has not been consistent in denying the
existence of a proportionality principle, but argued that Helm
exaggerated its existence in holding that proportionality review was
a firmly established component of Eighth Amendment case
law. 233 Rummel, Justice Scalia argued, correctly stated that the

229.

Id. Justice Scalia noted as an example that the principle of deterrence may require a more

severe penalty for crimes which are difficult to detect. Id. Justice Scalia stated that the weight to be
given to the various functions of punishment is inherently a legislative determination. Id. Justice
Scalia illustrated his assertion that proportionality is a retributive concept by noting that the ultimate
example of complete proportionality derives from the requirement of an eye for an eye in talionic
law. d. Requiring proportionality, Justice Scalia concluded, could interfere with a state's legitimate
experimentation with punishment objectives, such as rehabilitation and deterrence, which emphasize
attention to the individual offender. Id. at 2698; c. HJ.A. HART, PuNLSHMENT AND RESPONSIBLITY,
EsSAYS IN TkE PHiLSOPHY oF LAw, 1-27 (1968) (arguing that it is entirely possible to use
retributive concepts as a limitation upon the state's authority to punish, while still pursuing utilitarian
penological goals, such as deterrence and rehabilitation). If proportionality is viewed properly, as a
constitutional limitation upon the state's power to punish excessively, it is not inconsistent with the
pursuit of other legitimate state penal objectives. Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2698.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2699. Different states experience different needs and concerns, and one state should
not be hindered in its attempt to address those concerns by what another state has done. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. Justice Scalia argued that because the language of Weems will support either theory,
it has been used variously by the Court both to support and deny the existence of a proportionality
guarantee. Id. Compare Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977) (holding that Weems established
the principle that the Eighth Amendment bars excessive punishment) with Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (declaring that Weems stands for the principle that only methods of punishment
unique to Anglo-Saxon tradition can violate the Eighth Amendment).
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prior findings of violations of proportionality principles in the death
penalty context are to be limited to that context.' While Justice
Scalia would not disturb the death penalty holdings, he would not
extend proportionality review further."
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected Harmelin's claim that the text
and history of the Eighth Amendment required a finding that
Harmelin's life sentence was unconstitutional because it was
mandatory." 6 Justice Scalia pointed out that severe, mandatory,
sentences may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the
constitutional sense, as they have been employed throughout our
nation's history. 7
Justice Scalia's opinion acknowledged that various death
penalty cases have held that a mandatory capital sentence is "cruel
and unusual" under the "individualized capital sentencing
doctrine.""ar
These cases, Justice Scalia argued, have
continuously suggested that there is no comparable doctrine outside
the capital context."' This is simply another example of a
situation in which "death is different," according to Justice
Scalia.24

234.
235.

Harmelin, Il1 l.
Id.

236.

Id. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concurred with Justice

Ct. at2701.

Scalia's result. Id. at 2702-09.
237. Id. (noting that mandatory death penalties were common in the first federal penal code,

and in the states at the time of adoption of the Eighth Amendment).
238. Id. at 2701 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 289 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 393 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393
(1987)). This doctrine has made a death sentence violative of the Eighth Amendment if it is imposed
without a determination that the sentence is appropriate for the particular individual and for the
specific crime. Id.; see supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the overturning of a death
penalty case for failure to provide an individualized sentencing determination).
239. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702. The Court acknowledged that life imprisonment without

possibility of parole is the second most severe punishment known to law, but felt the Court had
drawn an analytical line and would not extend it further. Id.; see id. (citing Eddings 455 U.S. at 11012; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272) (noting that death

differs from all other forms of punishment, not simply because it is the most severe form of
punishment, but because of its total irrevocability and rejection of rehabilitation and humanity).
240. Id.
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C. The Plurality Opinion of Justice Kennedy
While reaching the same result as Justice Scalia on the
enforceability of Harmelin's sentence, Justice Kennedy's plurality
opinion was more closely in line with the Harmelin dissent in that
it acknowledged the existence of a proportionality guarantee under
the Eighth Amendment.24 ' Justice Kennedy noted the
disagreement between Justice Scalia and the dissent over the
history of the Eighth Amendment, but declined to join that
debate. 2 Rather, Justice Kennedy argued simply that stare
decisis required adherence to the narrow proportionality principle
existing in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence since the Weems
holding in 1910.243
Justice Kennedy pointed out that the proportionality principle
first declared in Weems had been most extensively applied in the
death penalty cases, but asserted that it also has limited application
in extreme cases where punishment is grossly disproportionate to
the crime. 244 Justice Kennedy discussed several principles in
connection with the scope and applicability of this narrow
proportionality guarantee.24 First, Justice Kennedy agreed with
Justice Scalia that the fixing of prison terms is generally within the
province of legislatures, rather than the courts.246 Sentences

241. Id. at 2702-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging the existence of a proportionality
principle for both capital and noneapital cases). Justices O'Connor and Souter joined in Justice
Kennedy's opinion.
242. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

243.

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

244.

Id. at 2702-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that Helm had invalidated

a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole as grossly disproportionate to the crime
of recidivism based on seven nonviolent felonies. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy discussed four principles: (1) The
primacy of the legislature in determining sentence length; (2) the acceptable and beneficial variety

of penological philosophies and schemes; (3) the requirements of our federal system of government;
and (4) the requirement that proportionality analysis be conducted utilizing objective factors. Id,

(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy asserted that these four factors lead to the conclusion that
the Constitution does not require strict proportionality, and that a sentence will be invalid only when
extreme and grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275

(1980)); cf. id. at 2699 (declaring that tolerance of diversity among the states in penological policy
and the means of implementing that policy is required by our federal system).

258

1992 / Harmelin v. Michigan
cannot be assessed and evaluated, Justice Kennedy asserted,
without agreement on the objectives of the penal system, and the
responsibility for determining those objectives lies with the
legislature. 247 For that reason, when a court reviews a particular
sentence for proportionality, substantial deference should be granted
to the broad authority of the legislature in determining the limits of
punishment for particular crimes. 248 Since the Eighth Amendment
does not mandate the adoption of any one penological theory,
criminal systems will accord differing weights to the goals of
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and rehabilitation, and as a
result will reach legitimate differences in sentence length.249
These marked differences in theories of sentencing and of length
of terms are inevitable and often desirable." 0
Justice Kennedy stated that a fundamental principle of
proportionality review is that federal courts should be guided by
objective factors to the greatest extent possible. 25' The most
prominent objective element, according to Justice Kennedy, is the
type of punishment imposed.252 For example, in Weems the Court
was able to compare, in an objective fashion, the unusual
punishment of cadena temporal with the more traditional
imprisonment in American jurisdictions. 253 This comparison is

247. Id. at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393

(1985)).
248. Id. at 2703-04 (Kennedy, J, concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,290 (1983);
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910)).
249. Id. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
250. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991));
see Helm, 463 U.S. at 291 (noting that our federal system produces a wide divergence in

constitutionally permissible sentences). Justice Kennedy noted that because state sentencing schemes
embody varying penological philosophies and objectives, different, but rational, differences will
occur. Harmelin, III S. Ct. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Since our Constitution remains
flexible enough to encompass differing views, the fact that a state imposes a more severe penalty for
a particular crime than the rest of the country does not alone indicate that it violates constitutional

limitations. Id.
251. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at27475; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
252. Id. (Kennedy, I., concurring).
253. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (describing
the punishment imposed in Weems and the Court's evaluation of its constitutionality).
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also the basis for an objective analysis in death penalty cases; death
differs in degree and kind from other types of punishment. 5 4
Finally, Justice Kennedy argued that the Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between the crime and the
sentence; it forbids only the extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime.255 Justice Kennedy noted that
Harmelin's crime of possessing 1.5 pounds, or approximately
32,000 to 65,000 doses of cocaine, is a crime which represents one
of America's greatest current social problems?5 6 Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the seriousness of the crime and the pernicious
effects of drug use demonstrate that the Michigan Legislature could
reasonably have concluded that the threat posed to the community
by individuals in possession in such large amounts of cocaine was
serious enough to warrant the deterrent and retributive effects of a
life sentence without possibility of parole.27 On this basis alone,
Justice Kennedy concluded that Harmelin's sentence did not exceed
constitutional boundaries.28
Justice Kennedy rejected the contention that case precedent,
including Helm, required a rigid analysis utilizing a clear three-part
test to determining the existence of gross disproportionality5 9
Justice Kennedy stated that interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional
comparisons, the second and third requirements under the Helm
analysis, are appropriate only in those rare cases in which a

254. Harmelin, III S. Ct. at 2704-05 (Kennedy, I, concurring); see supra notes 74-80
(discussing the Supreme Court's different analysis for the punishment of death as compared to all
other punishments).
255. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 288 (1983)).
256. Id. at 2705-06 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy used this fact to distinguish the
Harmein case from Helm, where the defendant had been convicted of several relatively minor
felonies. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Further, Justice Kennedy indicated that drug use, in addition
to its pernicious effects on the individual, is relative to crime in three ways: (1) The drug user may
commit other offenses because of drug-related physical changes; (2) a drug user may commit crime
in order to support his habit; and (3) the drug business or culture may produce violent crime. Id. at
2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Drug use has been linked to crimes of violence in a number of
studies. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

257. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
258. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 2706-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that while Helm considered these
elements, it did not require a rigid analysis involving each).
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threshold evaluation of the crime committed, and the sentence
imposed, leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.26
Comparative analysis, Justice Kennedy noted, had been rejected by
the Rummel and Davis Courts, and had a proper role only to
validate an initial judgement that a sentence is grossly
disproportionate to a crime.261 In light of the severity of
Harmelin's crime, Justice Kennedy argued, his sentence did not
and therefore
give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality,
262
a comparative analysis need not be performed.
Justice Kennedy's opinion also rejected Harmelin's contention
that his sentence was unconstitutional because it was mandatorily
imposed. Justice Kennedy emphasized that the mandatory nature of
the defendant's sentence distinguished the case from Helm, and
made the cases easy to reconcile.263 Since the defendant's
sentence in Helm was not mandatory, a lesser sentence would
challenge not the legislature's judgment, but the court's decision to
assign the most severe punishment within the permissible
range. 2 Harmelin's sentence, by contrast, had been mandated by
the state legislature and the sentencing judge was given no
discretion. 2c In Harmelin, invalidation of the defendant's
sentence would require rejection not of a sentencing court's
judgment, but rather of the wisdom of the state legislature, a step
the Court would take only under the most extreme circumstances. 2 6

260. Id. at 2707 (Kennedy, L,concurring). Justice Kennedy relied on the permissive language
concurring); see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290
in Helm to support this holding. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
n.17, 291 (1983) (noting that it "may be helpful" to conduct an inter and intra jurisdictional
comparison).
concurring). For example, the Court in Helm
261. HarmeUn, 111 S.CL at 2702 (Kennedy, J.,
and Weemr conducted an intra and interurisdictional comparisons after the threshold inference had

been reached that the sentence imposed was grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id.
262. Id. at 2707 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
263.

Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, ., concurring).

264. Id. at 2708 (Kennedy, ., concurring).
concurring).
265. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
266. Id. The Court argued that because the legislature has the authority to determine criminal
punishments, the Court has never overturned a sentence mndated by the legislature based only on
length of sentence. Id. To do so would be to reject the judgment of the entire citizenry of the state.
Id. Whether the particular sentencing scheme chosen is wise or unwise is a question best left to the
legislature to resolve. Id.
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E. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice White
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
dissented from the plurality opinions because he found that
Harmelin's sentence was disproportionate to his crime and
therefore constitutionally impermissible.267 Justice White argued
that although the Constitution does not explicitly mention
proportionality, the principle is textually supported by the spirit of
the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against excessive fines and
bail. 68 Justice White acknowledged that legal commentators
disagree as to whether the Eighth Amendment contained a
proportionality component,269 but asserted that the Supreme Court
had construed the text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause

267. Id. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined the dissenting
opinion of Justice White. Id. at 2709 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote separately to
emphasize that the death penalty is always unconstitutional, but noted that this view did not conflict
with Justice White's conclusion that the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality in noncapital
sentences. Id. at 2719 (Marshall, I., dissenting). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, added
an additional note that because a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole rejects
the rehabilitative function of the law, the sentence must rest on a rational determination that the
criminal conduct is so serious that society's objectives of deterrence and retribution completely
outweigh any interest in reforming or rehabilitating the offender. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,307 (1972)). While acknowledging that the Harmelin defendant's
crime was serious, Justice Stevens found it irrational to conclude that all similar offenders are
completely incapable of reform. Id. at 2720 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
268. Id. at 2709 (White, L,dissenting) (citing OLv'ER, THE RIoTS OF AN AMERICAN CIZEN,
185-86 (1832)) (arguing that the prohibition against unreasonable bail and fines indicate that
imprisonment for unreasonable lengths of time is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution). The
Eighth Amendment provides that '[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive Rines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIll. Justice White also noted that
because, as Justice Scalia admitted, the language of the Eighth Amendment could be construed to
contain a proportionality component, the First Congress could have explicitly stated the clause was
not meant to require proportionality had that been the intention. Harmelin, 111 S.CL at 2710 (White,
L, dissenting).
269. Harmelin, 111 S.CL at 2710 n.l (White, L, dissenting). Justice White pointed out that
at least one legal scholar has disagreed with the position taken by Justice Scalia that the amendment
was not intended to contain a proportionality guarantee. Id. (White, 3., dissenting). Justice White
noted that some legal scholars, after conducting extensive historical review, have concluded that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was intended to forbid both illegal and disproportionate
punishment. Id. (White, I., dissenting) (citing Granucci, supra note 42, at 860).
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to include such a guarantee for close to a century.270 Moreover,
Justice White noted, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning
the Eighth Amendment has long rejected a purely historical
analysis to limit the scope of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.27 ' According to Justice White, the Eighth
Amendment's prohibitions have not been confined simply to those
72
punishments thought to be barbaric in the eighteenth century.
The passage of time brings new conditions and new problems, and
a constitutional provision, to remain vital, must be flexible enough
to address these changes as they arise.27 3
Justice White stated that in order to address these changing
conditions, the Court has declared that punishment may violate the
Eighth Amendment if it is contrary to the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." '2 74 To
evaluate a sentence under this doctrine, jurists must look to the
three objective factors outlined in Helm to determine the standards
of modem American society as a whole.27 The analytical
framework provided by the Court in Helm, Justice White argued,
provides an objective analysis which has worked well in practice
among lower courts conducting proportionality review. 76 Justice
White observed that each factor of the three-part Helm test works
together to determine whether a punishment conflicted with

270. Id. at 2710-11 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
366-67, 371 (1910), held that punishments which were disproportionate violated the Cruel and

Unusual Punishment Clause); accord Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Enmund v
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,290 (1983). Justice White rejected
Justice Scalia's contention that proportionality is limited simply to death penalty jurisprudence as
unsupported by the text or purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2713 (White,

J., dissenting).
271. Harmelin, 111 S.CL at 2712 (White, J.,
dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 369 (1989)).
272. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
273. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
274. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).

275. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
276.

Id. at 2712-13 (White, J., dissenting).
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evolving of decency, and therefore forecloses the possibility of a
subjective determination. 2'
Justice White rejected Justice Kennedy's contention that a
punishment which has been legislatively mandated cannot be
reviewed by the Court for violations of the Eighth Amendment.27
Justice White pointed out that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Helm indicated that proportionality review was intended to apply
both to sentences imposed by sentencing judges within the range
authorized by the state legislature, and to legislatively mandated
sentences. 279 Further, Justice White reasoned that if legislatively
mandated punishments were automatically valid under the
Constitution, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
would be devoid of meaning.280 Moreover, Justice White argued
that declaring all legislatively mandated sentences constitutional,
conflicts with the principle set for in Marbury v. Madison,28 1 that
courts have a duty to determine whether legislative enactments are
consistent with the Constitution before applying those enactments
as the law.28 2
Justice White noted that several cases have recognized that
legislatively mandated sentences may violate the Eighth
Amendment.2 3 Justice White concluded that the fact that the
Court's duty to review these sentences for proportionality involves
a difficult task and requires sensitivity to issues of federalism does

277. Id. at 2713 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also pointed out that only a handful of
sentences have been overturned in the intervening years since Helm was decided, which should lay
to rest fears that judges would disregardprinciples of federalism and state autonomy. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting). Courts have also continued under Helm to respect principles of separation of government
powers, and have granted broad authority to state legislatures to determine the appropriate punishment

for crimes. Id. (White, ., dissenting).
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
370 U.S.

Id. (White, I., dissenting).
Id at 2713-14. (White, I., dissenting).
Id. (White, I., dissenting).
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the doctrine of judicial review).
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2713 (White, L, dissenting). The Court's decision in Robinson,
at 667, conclusively established that it is the Court's duty to evaluate the constitutionality

of punishments enacted by state legislatures as well as those promulgated by Congress. Id at 2714
(White, J., dissenting) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
283. Id. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274, n.11
(1980); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 n.3 (1982)).

264

1992 / Harmelin v. Michigan

not justify the Court's abrogation of its responsibility to uphold
constitutional principles.'
Justice White urged that Justice Kennedy's analysis of the
proportionality guarantee, by rejecting the three-factor analysis
found in Helm, eviscerated the principle, leaving only an "empty
shell. ' 2 5 Justice White noted that Justice Kennedy's insistence
that one factor, a comparison of the severity of the crime and the
sentence, was sufficient to evaluate proportionality directly opposes
Helm's pronouncement that no single factor or criterion is
dispositive of the proportionality issue.28 6 Proportionality
jurisprudence, Justice White argued, has consistently focused on
comparisons of objective factors, including inter and intra
jurisdictional comparisons. 287 Justice White stated that
abandonment of interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional
comparisons would leave no objective basis for determining
whether a punishment was proportionate or disproportionate.288
According to Justice White, an assessment only on the basis of the
gravity of the crime and punishment would result in a subjective
determination by the individual Justice as to whether a punishment

284. Harmelin, 111 S. CLt.at 2714. (White, J., dissenting).
285. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (stating that one
factor may be sufficient to determine the constitutionality of the punishment); see id. (White, J.,
dissenting) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 n.17 (1983)) (declaring that a combination of
objective factors is required to identify when a sentence violates the proportionality principle of the
Eighth Amendment).
287. Id. at 2714-15 (White, J., dissenting). For example, the Court in Weems noted the disparity
between the punishment for the crime at issue and the punishment for more serious crimes within
the same jurisdiction. Id. at 2715 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 380-81 (1910)). The Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), conducted an
interjurisdictional comparison in analyzing the proportionality of forfeiture of citizenship for wartime
desertion. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03). In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977), the Court surveyed the laws of the states prior to invalidating the death penalty for rape

of an adult woman. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 596). A comparison of the
laws of the states was conducted before concluding in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), that
the death penalty for conviction under a felony murder statute where there is no intent to kill is
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Enmund, 458 U.S.
at 797). Justice White argues that these comparisons were no less essential to the determination of
proportionality simply because they sometimes occurred after the Court had analyzed the severity of
the crime and sentence. Id. (White, L, dissenting).
288. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2715 (White, J., dissenting).
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was proportionate to the crime. 9 Therefore, the second and third
factors of Helm are required to provide objectivity in the
29
analysis.
Justice White continued that the difficult problem in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, as in other areas of constitutional law,
is not one of ordering, but of line drawing. 291' As an example,

Justice White pointed out that while it is clear that a twenty-five
year sentence is more severe than a fifteen year sentence, it is not
as clear that one sentence violates the Constitution while the other
does not.292 Justice White reasoned that determining whether the
Eighth Amendment line has been crossed involves an analysis
similar to that employed in determining when the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated. 293 Use of
the intra and inter jurisdictional factors in proportionality review is
therefore not unique in constitutional jurisprudence.294 Because
these factors are required to objectively assess the punishment, they
should not5 be eliminated from Eighth Amendment proportionality
29
analysis.
Applying the three-part Helm test to the facts of Harmelin,
Justice White determined that the defendant's sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment. 296 Relying on Helm, justice White first
assessed the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty.29 Justice White noted that since the state had no death
penalty, the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole was the most severe punishment Michigan
could impose on any criminal.9" The "absolute magnitude" of

289.
290.
291.
292.
293-

Id. (White,
Id. (White,
Id. (White,
Id. (White,
Id. (White,

J., dissenting).
J.,
J.,
J.,
.,

dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983)).
dissenting).

294.

Id. (White, J., dissenting).

295.

Id. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting) (declaring that there is no justification for overruling

or limiting Helm).
296.
297.
298.

266

Id. (White, I., dissenting).
Id. (White, ., dissenting) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)).
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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the defendant's crime, by comparison, was not considered
exceptionally serious. 99
The second Helm factor required an intrajurisdictional
comparison of sentences imposed on other criminals. 00 In
Michigan, life imprisonment without possibility of parole was
reserved only for first degree murder and possession of 650 grams
or more of narcotics, with or without intent to distribute3 'O
Crimes such as second degree murder, rape and armed robbery
were punished by a life sentence only in the exercise of judicial
discretion.' According to Justice White, this review clearly
revealed that the defendant was sentenced as severely or more

severely than offenders who have committed more serious
Cri IIS.303

The third factor required an interjurisdictional analysis to
determine the punishment which would have been imposed on the
defendant in other states. °4 Justice White concluded that the
sentence was undoubtedly far more severe than the defendant
would have received in any other jurisdiction. 3° Further, Justice
White believed there existed a national consensus that such a
penalty would not be imposed, and that consensus was so strong
299. Id. at 2717 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White evaluated such factors as the harm caused
or threatened by the crime, the culpability of the offender, the presence or absense of violence, and
the motive of the defendant to determine the gravity of the offense. Id. at 2716 (White, J.,
dissenting)
(citing Helm, 463 U.S. at 292-94). Justice White noted that while drug use causes serious damage
to society, many of the problems associated with drugs occur only as an indirect result of drug use,
and may flow from misuse of legal substances. Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2716-17 (White, J.,
dissenting). Also relevant was the fact that possession with intent to distribute was punished as
heavily as the lesser included offense of knowing possession of narcotics. Id. at 2717 (White, J.,
dissenting). Further, the statute applied equally upon the first arrest of an individual as to repeat
offenders. Id. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Helm, 463 U.S. at 292).
301. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718. (White, J., dissenting).
302. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
303. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
304. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Helm, 463 U.S. at 291-92).
305. Harmelin, 111 S.CL at 2718-19 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted that only
Alabama provided a mandatory sentence for any first time drug offender, and then only for
possession of ten kilograms or more of cocaine. Id. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting) (citing ALA. CODE
§ 13A-12-231(2)(d) (Supp. 1990)). The defendant would have received only a five year mandatory
minimum sentence in Alabama, and just over ten years under the federal sentencing guidelines. Id.
(White, J., dissenting) (citing AL.A. CODE §13A-12-231(2)(b) (Supp. 1990); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM*N GuIDE_NEs MANUAL, § 2d1.1 (1990)).
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that it established the punishment as cruel and unusual." 6
Therefore, Justice White asserted, Harmelin's sentence should be
invalidated under the Eighth Amendment." °

m.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

A guarantee of proportionality in sentence length survives the
Harmelin decision, but its scope and vitality remain uncertain." 8
While the four dissenting Justices and three Justices in the plurality
of Harmelin reinforced the existence of the proportionality
principle, agreement does not extend beyond recognition of the
guarantee. 3°9 Clearly, the fractured opinions in Harmelin will as
a whole limit the ability of lower courts to overrule sentences on
the grounds of disproportionality in the future.310 Overall,
Harmelinleaves the status of the proportionality guarantee
tenuous,
31 1
and the lower courts badly in need of guidance.
The proper scope to be accorded the proportionality principle
constitutes one of the main points of contention among those
Justices who recognize the existence of the guarantee. 12 The

306. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361,371 (1989)) (declaring that there is a degree of national consensus at which the Court has found
a punishment to violate the Eighth Amendment).
307. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2719. (White, J., dissenting).
308. See United States v. Contreras, 937 F2d 1191, 1195 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
although the contours of the proportionality principle are uncertain, a firm majority continues to
recognize the guarantee).
309. See Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declaring that stare decisis
requires the Court to recognize a proportionality principle); id. at 2711 (White, L, dissenting)
(concluding that the proportionality principle has been clearly recognized in Supreme Court
jurisprudence); cf. d at 2686 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment
does not contain a proportionality guarantee).
310. See The Supreme Court; 1990 Term, supra note 35, at 251 (notingthatthecase will curtail
proportionality review).
311. Lower courts will find the diverse Harmelin opinions difficult to apply because there is
such strong disagreement between members of the Supreme Court on the limitations of
proportionality review, the proper analysis under the proportionality principle, and the seriousness
of various crimes. See The Supreme Court; 1990 Term, supra note 35 at 252 (arguing that the
Harmelin decision threatens the vitality of proportionality review in death penalty cases as well as
noncapital cases because the same problems with proportionality review noted by the Justices in
Harmelin exist in death penalty cases as well).
312. See, e.g., Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2714 (White, J. dissenting) (expressing disagreement
with Justice Kennedy's analysis under the Eighth Amendment).
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dissent in Harmelinendorsed a fairly active use of proportionality
review, and noted that the lower federal courts that had addressed

the question of proportionality in cases subsequent to Helm were
313 Justice
able to efficiently and effectively dispose of the issue.
Kennedy's opinion, on the other hand, asserted that review should

be limited to cases of "gross disproportionality." 314 Justice
Kennedy indicated that reviewing sentences, except in the most
shocking situations, represents a violation of the principles of
federalism and separation of powers, and is a waste of judicial
resources."' Given the lack of direction offered in the Harmelin
opinions, lower courts will have to determine how egregious the
disproportionality
must be before proportionality review should be
316
granted.
Another source of uncertainty which lower courts must face
after Harmelin concerns the analysis which should be used when
the courts do in fact review the proportionality of a sentence.317
The Harmelin dissent advocated a continuation of the three-part
Helm test, 318 while Justice Kennedy's opinion rejected the intra
and inter jurisdictional components of Helm except in the rare
instance where severity of the punishment raises aprimafaciecase
of unconstitutional disproportionality. 319 Although four Justices
advocated continuing with the three-part test while only three

313. See id.at 2712-13 & n.3 (White, J.,
dissenting) (noting that lower courts have been able
to efficiently review sentences using the Helm three-part analysis).
314. Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
315. Id. at 2704 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (asserting that lack of objective reviewing standards
should make proportionality review a rarity, to be conducted only when there is an inference that the
sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime).
316. See United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1350 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting the debate
within the Supreme Court as to whether disproportionate sentences or only grossly disproportionate
sentences are invalid under the Eighth Amendment). But see The Supreme Court,1990 Term, supra
note 35, at 252 (concluding that proportionality review is appropriate in only the most extreme cases).
317. Compare United States v. O'Banion, 943 F.2d 1422, 1432 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing the
three-part test under Helm as appropriate for proportionality review after noting that two Justices had
expressed a desire to overrule Helm in Harmelin) with United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d
Cir. 1991) (noting that after Harmelin intra and inter jurisdictional comparisons are necessary only
in the rare situation where there is an inference of gross disproportionality between crime and
sentence).
318. See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716 (White, J.,dissenting) (analyzing the defendant's
sentence under the three factors of Helm).
319. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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supported abandoning it, it would be a dangerous oversimplification
of the Supreme Court's position on proportionality review for a
criminal defense attorney to rest an argument on the three-part test
alone, since the four members advocating the three-part test were
in the dissent.32 Adoption of Justice Kennedy's approach, which
consists of inquiring only whether the punishment is shockingly
disproportionate on its face, will result in very few successful
3 21
invocations of the proportionality principle.
It may be that a larger theoretical question drives the debate
surrounding the Eighth Amendment If society is to permit
punishment, it must be in pursuit of a legitimate penological
goal.3" If the permissible aims of punishment (deterrence,
rehabilitation, isolation, and retribution, among others)323 can be
achieved by a less severe punishment, imposition of a more severe
punishment may constitute excessive cruelty. 24 For example, the
Supreme Court in Weems indicated that punishments must not be

320. For example, some commentators have already concluded that after Harmelin, courts no
longer need to consider each of the three Helm factors. The Supreme Cour4 1990 Term, supra note
35, at 251.
321. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, supra note 35, at 251 (citing United States v.
Dunson, 940 F.2d 989,995 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that courts can quickly affirm even stiff sentences
after Harmelin). In Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cited with
approval by the Harmelin plurality, the court held that the threat to society from possession and sale
of drugs is sufficiently serious to warrant deterrence and retribution through a life sentence without
the possibility of parole even for minor transactions. See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2706.
322. See Note, supra note 3, at 635.
323. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,822-23 (1974) (listing deterrence, rehabilitation and
institutional security as the legitimate aims of punishment); Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2704 (citing
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-66 (1989); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949) (noting that courts over the years have recognized the goals of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation and rehabilitation as legitimate). The Supreme Court has stated that there is no
requirement under the Eighth Amendment that the state or federal government adopt any one
penological theory. Harmelin, I11 S. CL at 2704.
324. This theory was posed by Justices Goldberg, Brennan and Douglas in dissent to a denial
of certiorari in a case in which a convicted rapist was sentenced to death. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375
U.S. 889, 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Goldberg advocated
determining excessiveness by a comparative approach utilizing world-wide criminal legislation. Id.
(Goldberg, J., dissenting); see Packer, supra note 49, at 1071 (discussing the issues raised by the
dissent in Rudolph).
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excessive in terms of the desired penological goal. 325 The Weems
Court failed, however, to specify whether a punishment could be
considered cruel and unusual solely on the grounds that lesser
penalties were available to achieve the same end. If the punishment
is not reasonably necessary to attain the legitimate goals sought to
be achieved by the legislature, the sentence should be
invalidated. 26 The plurality in Harmelin rejected the assertion
that the Michigan Legislature's sentencing scheme had no chance
of success, or was so beyond the scope of the state's penal goals
that it violated constitutional boundaries.327 Based on this
language and the legal commentary noted above, an argument for
proportionality review before a federal court should include an
assertion that the sentence was excessive in terms of the
legislature's asserted penological goals.

325. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910). The Weems Court noted that the
distinction between a disproportionate sentence and a proportionate one was the distinction between
unrestrained power and power exercised under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to
establish justice. Id. Under a proportionate, and therefore constitutional, punishment the state suffers
no loss of power and suffers no harm. Id. A proportionate sentence can fulfill the state's purpose of
punishment, deter crime through just penalties, and allow hope for the reformation of the criminal.
Id. See generally Goldberg & Dershowitz, supranote 62, at 1795 (noting that this language in Weems
indicated that the Eighth Amendment principles applied to the severity of penalty necessary to
achieve the proper purposes of punishment as well as proportionality between crime and punishment).
See also Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (indicating that the death penalty is
unconstitutional if it produces hardship disproportionately greater than the harm it seeks to prevent,
or if a less severe punishment could as effectively achieve the permissible ends of punishment);
Packer, supra note 49, at 1076, 1079 (criticizing Justice Goldberg's opinion in Rudolph on the
ground that the Eighth Amendment addresses issues of decency, not rationality). But see Goldberg
& Dershowitz, supra note 62, at 1794 n.95 (stating that our moral tradition includes utilitarian costbenefit considerations in formulating our conscience).
326. See Note, supra note 3, at 641 (noting that the dissent to the denial of certiorari in
Rudolph posed this question as a means of determining whether a sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment). This reasoning, which resembles the analysis under substantive due process, could
provide a less vague standard for determining whether a sentence is proportional. Id.
327. Harmelin, 111 . Ct. at 2708.
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IV. CONCLUSION

While due weight should be given to legislative judgment,
judicial review of sentence lengths to determine if they violate the
Constitution

would

serve

the

ideals

behind

the

Eighth

Amendment 328 The Supreme Court declared in Helm that the
courts are competent to decide the gravity of an offense, at least on

a relative scale, as part of the courts' traditional function.3 29 The
Helm majority also found the courts competent to compare

sentences, and noted that although line-drawing outside a few
specialized areas could be difficult, this difficulty would not be
new to constitutional jurisprudence. 33° The review advocated by
Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, which requires courts to greatly defer
to legislative judgments concerning the goals of punishment and
the punishment needed to reach those goals, resembles the
"minimum rationality" test found in other areas of constitutional

328. Although a determination of the proper method and severity of punishment is more
appropriate as a legislative task than a judicial function, the judiciary can be "viewed as a bulwark
against possible legislative excesses." See Note, supra note 3, at 638. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 103 (1957) (declaring that the provisions of the Constitution are vital, living principles
which work to authorize and limit governmental power); id. (stating that the courts' duty to defend
the Constitution requires the scrutiny of statutes which threaten individual rights). But see Lockette
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (suggesting that this type of inquiry is the preserve of the
legislature, and may only be justified by the unique finality of the death penalty as punishment). For
a discussion of the appropriateness of a political role for courts concerning the issue of sentencing
disparity, see Richard G. Frey, Supreme Court Limits on Non-CapitalPunishment: The Politicsof
Proportionality,21 Wn1.tAMrm L RLv. 261 (1985).
329. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,292 (1983).
330. Id. at 294-95. The Court found that line-drawing was simplified in cases involving the
difference between the death penalty and imprisonment because a sentence of death differs not only
in degree, but in kind, from other punishments. Id. at 294. There is a similarly clear line between
sentences of imprisonment and those involving no deprivation of liberty. Id. at 294 n.18. According
to the Court, however, other areas of constitutional jurisprudence involve equally difficult linedrawing issues. Id. Within the context of the Sixth Amendment, for example, courts are required to
evaluate on a ease-by-case basis whether a delay in granting a trial is constitutionally permissible.
Id. at 295. This evaluation consists of using a functional analysis of the right within the particular
context of the case, utilizing a number of objective factors as a guide. Id. In a related context, the
determination of a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial requires the court to draw a line as
to the seriousness of the offense utilizing only the criteria of the relevant penalty involved. Id.
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law. 31 The minimum rationality test, however, is inconsistent
with the level of review established by the Court in other areas of
constitutional law involving personal liberties.3 32
In order to give meaning to the protection of personal liberties
espoused in the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court should
adopt heightened standards of scrutiny for excessive sentences.
Faithfulness to the ideals of the Eighth Amendment, which include
humanity and respect for human dignity, would seem to require
that the Eighth Amendment's promise be more than just an empty

shell.
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331. The Supreme Court 1990 Term, supra note 35, at 251 & n.52 (citing Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)). Rational basis review is employed in a number of areas
of constitutional law involving rights traditionally considered less personal than those involved in the
Eighth Amendment See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(applying rational basis review to federal regulation under the commerce clause); South Carolina State
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (applying rational basis review to state
regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (applying a rational basis review to state economic regulation under the due
process clause); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (applying rational
basis review state health and economic regulation under the Equal Protection Clause). Some
commentators have suggested a more deferential test for proportionality review. Id. (citing Mackey,
Rationalityversus Proportionality:Reconsidering the ConstitutionalLimits on Criminal Sanctions,
51 TENN. L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1984)).
332. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (stating that although the Court will
not sit as a super-legislature in reviewing social and economic legislation, it will employ a strict
scrutiny level of review to legislation which imposes restrictions on one's personal liberties). See
generally Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (applying strict scrutiny to zoning

regulations which prevented an extended family from living together); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute substantially interfering with the right to marry);
Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (applying heightened scrutiny to state
interference with an individual's right to reject unwanted medical treatment); United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (calling for heightened scrutiny of any statute which
displays prejudice against discrete and insular minorities); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to statute's making race-based classifications); Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (applying heightened scrutiny to statute's which
interfere with an individual's right to vote).
333. See Note, supra note 3, at 635, 639 (declaring that excessive punishment would appear
to violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in light of the interests served by the Eighth
Amendment); Goldberg and Dershowitz, supra note 62, at 1174 (noting that the purpose behind the
proportionality principle lies in fulflling both utilitarian principles and underlying concepts of
decency); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (defining the principle behind the Eighth
Amendment as the promotion of the dignity of man).
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